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A number of emerging market economies have been moving towards more exchange rate flexibility in 
the wake of the financial crises of the mid- and late 1990s. Accordingly, the exchange rate no longer 
plays the role of the main policy objective or the nominal anchor for many of these economies. At the 
same time, there seems to be a trend towards the adoption of more explicit inflation targets. 
Against this background, a number of conceptual and practical questions arise. For example, what is 
the role of the exchange rate when it is no longer the nominal anchor or, in particular, when an explicit 
inflation target is adopted? Under what circumstances should policymakers respond to exchange rate 
fluctuations? As importantly, under what circumstances - and how - have they actually responded? 
At least three separate interpretations of the exchange rate’s role in policy formulation can be distilled 
from the current discussions of inflation targeting. These three views can be termed the strict 
constructionist (on a jurisprudential analogy), the flexible inflation targeter and the Singaporean 
approach, respectively. 
The “strict constructionists” contend that the interest rate should respond to the exchange rate only 
insofar as it affects actual or forecast inflation. Any other response represents a departure from 
inflation targeting per se. Targeting inflation rather than the exchange rate as a monetary strategy is 
often associated with restricting central bank operations to domestic instruments to the exclusion of 
foreign currency instruments.
2  Beyond this association, the strict constructionist view also tends to 
frown upon intervention in the foreign exchange market either because it could confuse the public 
regarding the ultimate objective of monetary policy or, worse, because it could prove a slippery slope, 
tempting the policymaker to regress to targeting the exchange rate rather than inflation.
3  The general 
belief that foreign exchange intervention is likely to be ineffectual, except perhaps as a signal of 
monetary policy, further discourages its use. 
The “flexible inflation targeter” view, as outlined by Debelle (2001), holds that the exchange rate can 
also be a legitimate policy objective, alongside inflation and output targets. Taylor (2000b, 2001), who 
sees a deep connection between inflation targeting and the eponymous rule, argues that an exchange 
rate change that is consistent with the gap between global and targeted inflation rates can legitimately 
be entered into a Taylor rule.
4  One way to resolve the trade-off inherent in this “flexible” approach to 
inflation targeting is to use monetary policy to respond to the exchange rate only when inflation 
remains comfortably within target.
5  This lexicographical ranking of the different policy objectives can 
be seen in practice. 
The not widely appreciated “Singaporean view” holds that, when an economy is sufficiently open, and 
the pass-through sufficiently high, stabilising inflation requires close management of the effective 
exchange rate, albeit around a rate that varies according to the gap between global and desired 
                                                       
1   Gert Schnabel provided excellent support with tables and graphs. Special thanks to Angelika Donaubauer for her work on 
early versions of some tables and graphs. We wish to thank Claudio Borio, Gabriele Galati, Petra Gerlach-Kirsten, Stefan 
Gerlach, Ramon Moreno, Philip Turner, Agustín Villar, and William White for inspiration and comments at various stages of 
this paper. 
2   This association can be seen as an interpretation of the portrayal of inflation targeting (with flexible exchange rate) as an 
alternative policy framework choice to exchange rate targeting (with a peg, a band or a crawl), made popular especially after 
the Asian crisis (eg Debelle et al (1998) and Masson et al (1997)). The clean-cut, pedagogic interpretation of this portrayal 
would suggest that attending and reacting to the exchange rate and inflation targeting (supposedly a “floating” regime with a 
“domestic” objective) are mutually exclusive. 
3   The “slippery slope” argument may be related to the lack of a universally accepted distinction between exchange rate 
“targeting” and “management” in the current discourse on exchange rate regime choice. The ground covered by “managed 
floating” is ill defined and is thus necessarily open to some looseness in interpretation. 
4   However, he reads Ball (1999), Taylor (1999) and Svensson (2000) to suggest that it is not clear whether such an expanded 
rule represents an improvement on the simpler rule. 
5   The practical feasibility of this resolution rests on the assumption that the inflation target is defined in a way that allows for 
the possibility of some “wiggle room” in the form of, for example, a tolerance band around a point target, a target range 
(instead of a point), or a reasonably defined compliance time horizon. 2 
   
inflation (MAS (2001)). This last approach has inspired the estimation of an alternative version of the 
Taylor rule that uses the effective exchange rate rather than the short-term interest rate as the policy 
instrument (McCauley (2001)). In this case, managing the exchange rate is the means to achieve the 
end of low inflation, not the end in itself.
6 
For both the strict constructionists and the flexible inflation targeters, “policy” is typically taken to mean 
monetary policy, or more precisely, setting the policy interest rate.
7  However, even with the possibility 
of assigning priority to the inflation objective over any exchange rate concern, it is in general difficult to 
stretch a single instrument over multiple policy objectives. Thus, policymakers have in practice 
resorted to the use of other, perhaps “fractional”, instruments.
8  In particular, official intervention is 
seldom ruled out as a possible policy response among inflation targeting countries. On occasion, even 
capital controls have been used to address exchange rate concerns. Notwithstanding the limitations 
and costs of these alternatives, policymakers need to and do keep even thin arrows in their quiver. 
Given this background, our aim in this paper is to provide an overview analysis of the role of the 
exchange rate in inflation targeting regimes, with a strong focus on the policy scenarios that have 
arisen and what policymakers have actually done in practice. We contrast the experience of 12 
emerging market inflation targeters, most of whom have as yet a relatively short history of inflation 
targeting, with that of six of their industrial country counterparts (see Table 1 in the Annex for an 
overview of these countries).
9  We analyse four reasons why the exchange rate can matter: its impact 
on inflation, on the external sector, on financial stability and on the functioning of the foreign exchange 
market. We also break ranks with most conventional treatments of the subject to examine how not 
only monetary policy but also foreign exchange intervention and capital controls have been used in 
response to the challenges posed by unwelcome exchange rate fluctuations. However, we do not 
evaluate the effectiveness of the policy actions taken and, still less, the optimality of the regimes 
represented.
10 
Our main observations are as follows: 
First, emerging market economies tend to be relatively more vulnerable to the various consequences 
of exchange rate fluctuations than are industrial economies. We find evidence suggesting that the 
greater vulnerability arises from, among other possible factors, patterns of consumption associated 
with relatively low incomes and histories of higher inflation. We thus expect exchange rate 
considerations to figure more prominently in policymaking in emerging market economies than in their 
industrial economy counterparts, regardless of the specific policy regime. 
Second, even under a strict construction of inflation targeting, exchange rate considerations can be 
expected to play a more prominent role in emerging market economies, given the greater sensitivity of 
their domestic prices to the exchange rate. Indeed, the experience of recent years shows that 
                                                       
6   Amato and Gerlach (2002) point out that some countries (eg Chile and Israel) formally incorporated an exchange rate target 
range/path in their inflation targeting framework, at least in the transition phase. Using the exchange rate to guide inflation 
may not be incompatible with inflation targeting after all. 
7   This is perhaps an artefact of the popularity of the Taylor rule framework in mainstream monetary policy analysis. However, 
one should recall that this framework was originally developed to describe empirically the policy behaviour of a large and 
relatively closed economy, in which the power over exchange rate policy is not in the hands of the central bank. Adhering to 
this framework but introducing an exchange rate term implies that the central bank must use only the policy interest rate to 
deal with the exchange rate as well. This implication, if taken as a policy prescription, does not respect Tinbergen’s insight 
about the number of instruments and objectives. It is also not always applicable in practice, not least because not all central 
banks in the world are institutionally precluded from taking an active role in exchange rate policy. 
8   Dooley, in presenting his paper with Dornbusch and Park (2002), described foreign exchange market intervention (or, more 
generally, changes in the currency composition of the official balance sheet) as a fractional instrument. 
9   Our sample is not exhaustive. Furthermore, we will not be parsing exchange rate regime classifications in the manner of 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) or Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). Nor will we concern ourselves with whether each 
economy is a “fully fledged” inflation targeter or not, based on criteria à la Mishkin (2000, page 1). Our main criterion is that 
the economies represented are ones that are widely recognised to have moved away from exchange rate based policy 
frameworks and have explicitly moved towards inflation targeting. 
10   For broad cross-country studies on the institutional aspects and macroeconomic performance of inflation targeting regimes, 
see for example Sterne (2001), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002). Just to be clear, 
we will not address in this paper the broader question of optimal exchange rate regime choice. Our analysis will focus on 
policy response to exchange rate fluctuations given the economy has somehow adopted inflation targeting already.  
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emerging market inflation targeters have suffered large exchange rate movements more often than 
their industrial country counterparts. Furthermore, such exchange rate movements are also associated 
more often with missed inflation targets among emerging market economies. In short, exchange rate 
movements appear to have posed significant challenges to emerging market inflation targeters. 
Third, the emerging market economies analysed here have also responded flexibly to the exchange 
rate above and beyond its impact on inflation. In some cases, the width of the inflation target range 
has left room for the policymaker to respond to these challenges. In other cases, alternative or even 
multiple policy instruments have been deployed as one way of resolving certain types of dilemmas 
arising from the policymaker’s effort to attend to - though not necessarily target - more than one 
objective. Nevertheless, at least in the period under consideration, we cannot identify any instance of 
a policy interest rate change that is aimed at influencing the exchange rate but that directly contradicts 
the mandate to achieve the announced inflation target. Thus, the view that emerging market 
economies are so preoccupied with stabilising the exchange rate that they have not really been 
properly targeting inflation remains, to say the least, undemonstrated. 
Finally, none of the above should be taken to suggest that the cost of exchange rate movements and 
the policy attention thereto are relevant only to emerging market economies. The recent experience of 
Australia, Sweden, Switzerland and even the G3 serves as a clear reminder that having to keep an 
eye on the exchange rate is also a fact of life in industrial economies, inflation targeting or not. 
The main policy implications of these observations are twofold. First, given the importance of the 
exchange rate, particularly for emerging market economies, there is all the more need to understand 
better the nature of exchange rate dynamics, their impact on the economy and the effectiveness of 
policy instruments in coping with them. Second, since a certain degree of flexibility is called for in 
policy response, clear and consistent communication of policy intention is vital to the conduct of policy 
and the credibility of the policy regime. 
This paper covers some of the same concerns that have been cited as giving policymakers a so-called 
“fear of floating”.
11 However, we have serious reservations about the validity of this popular 
characterisation of policy behaviour. For a start, we do not agree with the presumption that “low” 
observed exchange rate volatility automatically implies a conscious policy effort to manage the 
exchange rate. More fundamentally, “floating” per se does not fully define a monetary regime. Once 
the monetary regime is specified, it implies some role for the exchange rate. Thus, to claim that only 
so volatile an exchange rate is consistent with “true” or “proper” floating or inflation targeting is, in our 
view, not necessarily correct.
12  As we will demonstrate later in this paper, the inflation targeters in our 
sample do have rather diverse experience of exchange rate variability. Moreover, there is no indication 
that the emerging markets have lower exchange rate variability compared to their (non-G3) industrial 
country counterparts.
13  This finding stands in contrast to the claim that policymakers in emerging 
market countries have successfully chosen low exchange rate volatility over their inflation targets. 
The balance of this paper examines the role of the exchange rate in inflation targeting in two parts. 
First, we discuss in Section 2 four reasons why the exchange rate matters. In analysing the sensitivity 
of inflation to the exchange rate (pass-through), we consider the standard macroeconomic factors and 
also less investigated structural factors. In analysing the impact on the external sector, we look at 
degree of openness to trade and trade patterns. We examine two ways that exchange rate fluctuations 
may impinge upon financial stability: real exchange rate misalignment and currency mismatches on 
balance sheets. We also review several microeconomic factors behind policymakers’ concern about 
not only longer-term trends but also shorter-term volatility of the exchange rate. We document the 
greater vulnerability on these four fronts among 12 emerging market economies that have recently 
moved towards inflation targeting as compared with our control group of six inflation targeting 
                                                       
11   Calvo and Reinhart (2000a, b), Hausmann et al (2000, 2001) and Goldfajn and Olivares (2001) are recent works that 
analyse this phenomenon. For an earlier study of devaluations that raises many of the same issues, see Cooper (1971). 
12   Eichengreen (2001) illustrates how the pursuit of the inflation target may under some circumstances produce low exchange 
rate volatility that should not be interpreted as “fear of floating”. Thus, there is no reason to assume that proper inflation 
targeting must be associated with a certain level of exchange rate volatility. Willett (2002) also seems to see through this 
fallacy and calls for a more balanced view. 
13   These non-G3 industrial country inflation targeters are, in our opinion, a more sensible benchmark than the conventional 
choice of the G3 economies. 4 
   
industrial economies, as well as the euro area, Japan and the United States. The second part of the 
paper begins in Section 3, where we document our 18 inflation targeting countries’ record of inflation 
outcomes vis-à-vis their announced targets in the last five years. We then juxtapose this record of 
intentions and outcomes with changes in effective exchange rates over the same period. We find that 
the association of inflation target misses with large exchange rate movements has been stronger 
among emerging market inflation targeters than among their industrial country counterparts. The rest 
of Section 3 is devoted to policy response. We examine the various scenarios under which monetary 
policy, official interventions and capital controls have been used, illustrating with recent examples, 
mainly from 2000 to 2002.
14  Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Why the exchange rate matters 
Why do policymakers care about exchange rate fluctuations? To begin with, the impact on prices 
through trade and expectations may be the most direct concern, particularly for inflation targeting 
economies. However, there are also other reasons for concern. These include the impact on the 
external sector, on financial stability and on the functioning of foreign exchange markets. Perhaps 
except for the last item, these vulnerabilities have been discussed one way or another in studies that 
seek to explain why some economies may be reluctant to see large adjustments in the value of their 
domestic currencies. 
Besides documenting these vulnerabilities, we will also review some of their potential determinants 
and put them in perspective with each other whenever possible. The main message is that the 
exchange rate matters, potentially for any economy, but particularly for emerging market economies. 
Accordingly, the policy attitude and behaviour towards the exchange rate in emerging market 
economies are likely to have to differ from those in industrial economies. More specifically, emerging 
market economies may have to approach inflation targeting somewhat differently than their industrial 
economy counterparts. To the extent that some of the vulnerabilities are arguably legacies of poor 
past policies, there is hope for relief through an improved conduct of policy. However, vulnerabilities 
that are associated with structural factors may take longer to be reduced. 
2.1  The effect of exchange rate on inflation 
Exchange rates can influence inflation through the prices of traded final goods and imported 
intermediate goods, and through their impact on inflation expectations. In this sense, the exchange 
rate could be potentially important under any policy regime that to some extent cares about inflation, 
but it is likely to be of particular relevance when inflation is billed as the main objective. 
There exists a long-standing line of research on the influence of exchange rate changes on domestic 
prices - the so-called exchange rate pass-through. It is a well documented stylised fact that emerging 
market economies tend to experience higher pass-through. This stylised fact also holds up in our 
country sample. Estimates from several recent studies are shown in Table 2. We do not expect the 
magnitudes of estimates to be comparable across studies, but the broad difference between the 
emerging market and industrial economy averages seems to be robust across studies.
15 
On this point alone, one can conclude that policymakers in emerging market economies are likely to 
be relatively more concerned about the exchange rate, not least for its impact on domestic prices. But 
pushing the argument one step further, why do emerging market economies as a group tend to have 
higher pass-through? In the rest of this subsection, we review some potential determinants and will 
argue (1) that lower-income economies are expected to show a stronger linkage between the 
exchange rate and domestic prices - and that they do in fact, (2) that a history of high inflation 
                                                       
14   There are potentially other types of policy options. For example, commercial policies or other taxes/subsidies can be applied 
to compensate the groups that would be adversely affected by exchange rate fluctuations. Prudential policies can be used 
to mitigate the impact of exchange rate fluctuations. However, we will not be addressing these alternatives in this paper. 
15   The rest of our analysis uses the pass-through coefficients estimated by Choudhri and Hakura (2001), since they provide 
the most complete coverage of our country sample (the only ones missing are those for Japan and for the euro area).  
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accentuates this linkage and (3) that any recent attenuation of this linkage has not changed the 
conclusion that policymakers in emerging markets will tend to worry more about the exchange rate 
than their counterparts in industrial countries. 
Determinants of exchange rate pass-through 
What determines how susceptible domestic prices are to the influence of exchange rate changes? At 
an intuitive level, one would suspect that more open economies would be generally more exposed. As 
our country sample shows, emerging market economies are more open compared to industrial 
countries, especially the G3 (Table 2). The Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico and the Asian 
economies, in particular, have even become increasingly more open in recent years. One clear 
exception is Brazil, where openness has been low at levels comparable to the G3. Although a number 
of non-G3 industrial countries are in fact quite open (over 40% of GDP), none of them can compare to 
the very open Czech Republic, Hungary and Thailand (over 80%).
16 
However, a simple regression shows that openness per se is not significantly correlated with pass-
through, at least not in our sample (Table 4, column I). This lack of an obvious linear relationship 
between openness and pass-through among our sample countries can also be visualised in a scatter 
plot diagram (see Graph 1 below, upper panel). 
This intuitive prior may be too simplistic after all: the overall degree of openness is by no means a full 
reflection of the share of tradable goods in the price index. For instance, along the line of Engel’s Law, 
one can imagine that a lower-income country, even if large and relatively closed (eg Brazil), can still 
have a high share of tradable foodstuffs and manufactures in its consumption basket - and thus the 
price index.
17  An alternative prior can thus be formulated: the exchange rate would play a bigger role 
in the inflation process at lower levels of income. 
The original statement of Engel’s Law is that the share of expenditure on food declines as income 
rises. A broader version of Engel’s Law, however, recognises that services are in aggregate superior 
goods. That is, in higher-income economies, services tend to bulk large in consumption, while 
manufactures and agricultural goods occupy an accordingly smaller portion of the consumption 
basket. As services are typically non-traded goods, their prices tend to reflect mainly domestic labour 
market conditions. The prices of tradable manufactures and agricultural goods, however, are 
comparatively more susceptible to the influence of the exchange rate.
18  Since lower-income 
economies have a larger portion of traded goods in the consumption basket, the significance of the 
exchange rate in the evolution of domestic inflation also tends to be greater in such economies.
19 
A scatter plot of per capita income and pass-through lends support to this alternative view (Graph 1, 
lower panel). All the high-income industrial economies are clustered in the lower-right quadrant, while 
the emerging market economies are dispersed over the left half of the plot.
20  A simple regression 
shows that income is negatively and significantly correlated with pass-through (Table 4, column II). 
 
                                                       
16    Among the six industrial country inflation targeters, Sweden (with trade just above half of GDP) was arguably the most open 
at the inception of its inflation targeting regime. However, this level of openness is in fact no more than the median 
openness among the 12 emerging market inflation targeters in recent years. An earlier econometric analysis by Gerlach 
(1999) finds a negative correlation between openness and the adoption of inflation targeting among industrial economies. 
This result conforms with the conventional view that inflation targeting is an alternative to exchange rate based monetary 
regimes and is therefore more likely to be chosen by less open economies. While the subsequent adoption of inflation 
targeting by Iceland and Norway is consistent with Gerlach’s findings, its adoption by very open emerging market 
economies represents an out-of-sample challenge to the analysis. 
17   With regard to food, Debelle (2001) notes that food forms a larger share of the consumption basket in emerging market 
economies and that food prices “are subject to the vagaries of the weather”. 
18   The extreme caricature would be that manufactures and agricultural goods are all subject to the law of one price, so that 
their prices move one-to-one with the exchange rate. 
19   The exclusion, under some policy frameworks, of foodstuffs or oil prices from the targeted concept of core inflation may 
lessen, but is unlikely to overturn, this presumption. In addition, there is also a question of whether it is in fact 
counterproductive to leave out from the targeted inflation index components that matter to the livelihood of the public. 
20   Except the borderline cases of New Zealand and Israel, there is a clear divide between industrial and emerging market 
economies by way of per capita income (at about the USD 15,000 level). Thus, it is valid, at least with respect to our sample 
of countries, to use the terms “industrial” and “emerging” to characterise “high” and “low” income levels. 6 





















































































1 One-year pass-through according to Choudhri and Hakura (2001).   2  Average level of the ratio between merchandise exports 
plus imports and GDP (in percentages) 1995-2001.   3 GDP per capita in thousands of US dollars; 1995 PPP.   
Sources: Choudhri and Hakura (2001); OECD; national data; BIS.
Interestingly, however, this result holds only with the full sample, and not with industrial and emerging 
market subsamples. This seems to suggest that only a migration across the industrial/emerging 
market divide (not just a marginal change in income) is associated with any significant change in the 
sensitivity of domestic prices to the exchange rate.
21 
Nevertheless, the notable differences in pass-through across emerging market economies imply that 
other factors are at work. In particular, several studies have found that exchange rate pass-through 
has tended to be stronger in Latin America than in Asia, even though Latin American economies are 
not necessarily more open than their Asian counterparts.
22  Among the many social, economic and 
                                                       
21   In fact, a (negative) log or exponential type relationship fits the full sample better than a linear one. This suggests that the 
association between income and pass-through is stronger at very low income levels than at higher income levels. 
22   For example, Kamin and Klau (2001) and Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) report such differences. Loungani and Swagel 
(2001) investigate the sources of inflation in developing countries and also find regional differences.  
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political factors that might account for this observation, inflation history has emerged as a prime 
candidate. Choudhri and Hakura (2001) provide rather convincing empirical evidence on the 
relationship between pass-through and inflation history for a large set of countries.
23 
On this count, emerging market economies again differ in a manner that makes the exchange rate 
more important for them. While the industrial world has been enjoying single digit inflation for over two 
decades, some emerging market economies are still striving to bring inflation down (Table 3). The 
more favourable position of industrial economies can be readily seen in Graph 2 (upper panel); but this 
time, the income divide does not seem to assert itself so strongly: some emerging market economies 
(eg Thailand, Korea and the Czech Republic) are also present among the low-inflation/low-pass-
through group in the lower-left quadrant.  
A simple regression obtains a positive but not very statistically significant relationship between inflation 
history and pass-through (Table 4, column III). Re-running the regression with the natural log of 
inflation history produces a much better fit by reducing the disproportionate impact of the countries 
with histories of very high inflation (Table 4, column IV). The fit improves yet more and the significance 
increases markedly if we follow the approach of Choudhri and Hakura (2001) and exclude the 
countries with average inflation of greater than 30% (Brazil, Mexico, Israel and Poland).
24  
Furthermore, analysis with subsamples shows that this positive relationship holds among the 
emerging market economies (especially if those with high inflation histories are excluded) but not 
among the industrial economies. This finding suggests that, for economies that have already been in a 
low-inflation environment for some time, marginal changes in inflation are not likely to be associated 
with significant changes in pass-through. But at least for economies with histories of moderate 
inflation, there may be significant scope for ameliorating the sensitivity to exchange rate movements 
by bringing inflation down and thereby rebuilding a lower-inflation history.
25 
A related point is the history of currency crises. Episodes of rapid and large devaluation or 
depreciation could raise the salience of the local price of foreign exchange in domestic prices and 
wages, and could lead to the use of foreign currency in transaction and financial contracting, all of 
which could contribute to heightening the exchange rate sensitivity of domestic inflation. Our 12 
emerging market economies are on the whole more prone to currency crises in the post-Bretton 
Woods era than are their industrial counterparts (Table 3).
26  However, since crises and inflation 
history tend to be related, crisis history per se may not be an independent factor underlying higher 
pass-through. 
Other associations with pass-through have also been put forth. For example, in the area of research 
on “financial dollarisation”, Honohan and Shi (2002) report a strong relationship between dollarisation 
and pass-through for a large set of emerging market economies. This relationship does not seem to 
hold in our full sample (Table 4, column V).
27  Switzerland, in particular, appears to be an outlier 
(Graph 2, lower panel). If we discard this observation, then we do obtain a positive, albeit not very 
statistically significant relationship. The fit of the relationship improves yet further if we consider 
emerging market economies only.
28  But then again, there is the question of whether dollarisation is a 
                                                       
23   In a parallel, time series argument, Taylor (2000a) contends that recent decline in pass-through (pricing power of firms) in 
industrial countries is a result of the low and stable inflation environment achieved in recent years. 
24   For both specifications (with inflation and log of inflation), R
2 increases to over 0.6 and the coefficient is positive and highly 
significant (t-statistic greater than 4). 
25   This hypothesis is tested by Baqueiro et al (2002). They find that for a group of small open economies that have recently 
undergone a disinflation process, pass-through weakens as the level of inflation falls. They find that real variables that relate 
to competition via trade also have an effect. They therefore argue that once nominal variables stabilise and markets become 
competitive, the “fear of inflation” (a sentiment shared by most central bankers) should no longer imply the “fear of floating”. 
26   A notable exception is New Zealand, which experienced a series of crises in the 1970s and 80s, but has since stabilised. 
Thus, it may not be a surprise that New Zealand’s pass-through coefficient ranks high among industrial economies. 
27   Dollarisation is defined in this context as foreign currency deposits held as a percentage of the M2 money supply. It should 
also be noted that there is very little overlap between our sample and the one used by Honohan and Shi (2002).  
28    The regression excluding Switzerland yields R
2 = 0.11, t-statistic = 1.42. The regression with the emerging market 
subsample only yields R
2 = 0.16, t-statistic = 1.38. 8 
   
determinant of pass-through in its own right or is in fact, together with pass-through, jointly derived 
from a common factor, such as inflation history.
29 
This question points to the broader issue of the relative importance of all these factors as potential 
determinants of exchange rate pass-through. Multiple regression results show that, of the four 
macroeconomic factors discussed above, income level and inflation history tend to stand out in terms 
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1 One-year pass-through according to Choudhri and Hakura (2001).   2 Average change in consumer prices 1980-2001; for Czech
Republic, 1985-2001; excluding Brazil (outlier).   3 Resident non-banks’ foreign currency holdings held domestically and abroad as
a percentage of M2; end-2001; excluding Switzerland (outlier). For Brazil only foreign currency holdings held abroad.
Sources: Choudhri and Hakura (2001); OECD; national data; BIS.
 
                                                       
29   In our sample, there seems to be a non-linear relationship. Countries with little dollarisation all have low inflation. Those with 
medium levels of dollarisation tend to have either low or high inflation. Except for Switzerland, the countries with high levels 
of dollarisation tend to be the ones with medium inflation. This suggests that dollarisation does tend to be positively 
associated with inflation history, at least in the low to medium range.  
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Although our review has been heavy on macroeconomic factors, some microeconomic explanations of 
pass-through are also worth mentioning. For example, Michael Devereux and Charles Engel have 
argued in various works that “local currency pricing” can limit the importing country’s exposure to the 
inflationary impact of exchange rate depreciation. However, local currency pricing may characterise a 
strategy adapted mainly to the largest markets such as the United States and, to a lesser extent, other 
industrial countries, but not to emerging markets. For instance, in Asia and many other emerging 
markets, trade is often invoiced in US dollar terms, as noted by McKinnon (2000, 2001). This practice 
leaves these economies more exposed to changes in the value of the dollar. 
Has pass-through diminished? Does it still matter? 
Some events in the 1990s appear to suggest an attenuation of exchange rate pass-through among 
both industrial and emerging market economies. For example, there was surprisingly little inflation in 
countries like Sweden and Italy after their currencies fell out of the European exchange rate 
mechanism in 1992. More recently, inflation rose only modestly in Brazil after the devaluation of the 
real in early 1999. Some recent empirical studies also offer evidence of a general decline in exchange 
rate pass-through in the 1990s. For example, Gagnon and Ihrig (2001) report this result for industrial 
countries. Mihaljek and Klau (2001) report a similar finding for emerging economies. 
There are several plausible explanations for this observation. Central bankers are well disposed to the 
view that the adoption of price stability-oriented policy frameworks and the build-up of policy credibility 
have anchored wage and price expectations at more moderate levels.
30 Structural reforms and the 
integration of emerging market economies into the global economy may have contributed to an 
increase in competition and a decrease in market power.
31 
Nonetheless, it remains an open question as to whether pass-through has indeed stabilised at a lower 
level. Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) argue that the impact of exchange rate on inflation that 
materialises during a crisis may not be a good predictor of the impact under more normal 
circumstances. They highlight several nuances in the relationship between exchange rate and 
inflation. For example, an exchange rate move that reflects a welcomed correction of a misalignment 
may have little effect on inflation (eg as in the ERM case). A depressed macroeconomic environment 
during a crisis (eg Brazil in 1999) may also limit the room for pass-through. In their empirical analysis, 
they find that using full-sample estimates of the pass-through equation coefficients to predict inflation 
performance during the crises of the 1990s would generally produce upward bias in the prediction. 
This provides some indications that the two oft-cited examples - both being crises - should not be 
taken as conclusive evidence that pass-through has permanently declined.
32 
Regardless of whether exchange rate pass-through has indeed decreased, no one has yet argued that 
it has done so in such a way that invalidates the observation that the connection between exchange 
rate and inflation is still generally stronger among emerging market economies. 
Moreover, if inflation is the bottom line (for example, in an inflation targeting regime), then sufficiently 
large exchange rate movements can still be a threat, for any positive degree of pass-through. This 
threat might have been less obvious in 2000, a relatively tranquil year for emerging market currencies 
(Graph 3). However, in 2001, the rapid declines of the South African rand and the Brazilian real were 
accompanied by a rise in inflation that prompted policy reactions (see Section 3).
33  Turkey and 
Argentina did see a substantial rise in inflation after the collapse of their currencies in 2001 and 2002, 
                                                       
30   Some observers note that the move away from focusing on the exchange rate as the main nominal anchor may have helped 
dissociate somewhat the public’s inflationary expectations from movements in the exchange rate. This may be particularly 
true for countries with a history of devaluation-inflation spirals. 
31   Structural reforms may include improvement in factors affecting inflation dynamics. For example, the elimination of much of 
the backward-looking indexation in Brazil during the Real Plan era, by lessening the perpetuation of any initial shock, may 
be one key factor behind the apparent amelioration of pass-through since the devaluation in 1999. 
32    Along a somewhat different line, Campa and Goldberg (2002) argue that micro factors (eg import composition) may 
dominate macro factors in the determination of pass-through. This implies that pass-through can change over time 
independently of the macroeconomic environment. But then, this can also be read as a counterargument to the concern 
expressed by Taylor (2000a) that the current low degree of pass-through could be upset simply by a shock to inflation. 
33   Even if one takes into consideration the higher inflation rates of these two countries, the extent and speed of the two 
currencies’ movements in 2001 (and also in 2002) cannot possibly be fully accounted for.  10 
   
respectively.
34  Even low-inflation Korea saw a notable co-movement of depreciation and inflation in 
late 2000 and early 2001. 
In conclusion, if the focus of monetary policy is mainly or exclusively on inflation, then one would 
expect that monetary authorities in emerging market economies would devote greater attention to the 
evolution of the exchange rate and its influence on domestic prices. Moreover, one would expect that 
their public statements explaining policy changes would more frequently flag the risks of exchange 
rate movements. This is clearly the case in Brazil, for instance, where the exchange rate has been a 
significant challenge to monetary policy in recent years. Indeed, this observation also applies to the 
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Graph 3
1 1999 Q1 = 100; quarterly averages; increasing values indicate appreciation.
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS.  
2.2 External  sector 
Besides their implications for inflation, exchange rate trends and uncertainty in general can also be 
causes for concern via their potential impact on the external sector. For example, an overly strong 
exchange rate could, apart from having a disinflationary effect, affect an economy’s external 
competitiveness, which could in turn impinge on the external balance, aggregate demand and growth. 
Persistence in such trends may, in the longer run, influence the incentives for investment and the 
                                                       
34   In Turkey, cumulative inflation in the six months after the February 2001 devaluation was about 34% (cumulative 
depreciation in the same period was about 52%). In Argentina, cumulative inflation was about 30% in the six months after 
the January 2002 devaluation, despite a 72% depreciation. Nonetheless, this rise in inflation is not entirely insignificant 
considering that the Argentine economy was in fact experiencing a mild deflation in the years before the crisis.  
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allocation of resources among different sectors. In addition, exchange rate fluctuations may generate 
uncertainties that could impede trade.
35 
These external sector consequences of exchange rate fluctuations are expected to be more relevant 
for economies that are more open to and dependent on trade. Emerging market economies are 
potentially more vulnerable on this count, given the relatively larger and often still increasing role of the 
external sector in these economies (see Table 2). 
A conventional view is that in more open economies, aggregate profits are more likely to be positively 
correlated with exchange rate competitiveness. Thus, other things being equal, avoiding an 
uncompetitive exchange rate will make for stronger profits and incentives to invest.
36  Moreover, to the 
extent that the tax take is larger out of corporate earnings than out of household income (through, for 
example, the double taxation of dividends), the authorities may also have an immediate stake in 
preventing a profit squeeze through the exchange rate. 
A related point is that the authorities in emerging markets are also more likely to see themselves as 
competing for foreign direct investment in their traded goods sector. For many emerging market 
economies, such investment meets the need not so much for capital inflow per se as for the transfer of 
state of the art technology and management. A multi-year appreciation of the currency would handicap 
an economy twice in such a competition: once in deflecting investment during the period of 
overvaluation and once again in leaving a record of squeezed profits in traded goods production that 
may inhibit investment even after competitiveness has been restored.  
While openness relates to how exposed an economy is to exchange rate fluctuations, the bilateral 
trade pattern, which exhibits noticeable regional differences, helps to determine which exchange 
rate(s) would serve as a reference point for policymakers (Table 5). Canada and Mexico, with over 
80% of exports going to and over 60% of imports coming from the United States, are likely to be most 
concerned about their US dollar exchange rates. Trade flows to and from non-euro area Europe are 
overwhelmingly oriented towards the euro area, making developments in the euro exchange rate the 
most important. The trade of Brazil, Chile, Israel and South Africa is split mainly between the United 
States and the euro area, while that of Asia tends to be split between the United States and Japan 
(and the euro area in some cases). These observations imply that movements among the major 
currencies can exert a significant and disparate impact on these emerging market economies, often 
leaving their policymakers with little choice but to react in some fashion. 
Furthermore, the pattern of export competition in third markets also factors into the way in which the 
external sector is likely to be affected by the exchange rate. For example, in economies such as Korea 
with export profiles by sector similar to that of Japan, the rapid decline of the yen (as seen in late 2000 
and 2001) would raise considerable concerns regarding export competitiveness. 
The fact that many emerging market inflation targeters do attach considerable weight to the external 
sector and hence the exchange rate, above and beyond its immediate implications on inflation, can 
also be seen in their policy statements. For instance, in Thailand, a very trade-dependent economy, 
policymakers’ consideration of the export sector is quite frequently explicitly mentioned in monetary 
policy statements. Furthermore, as this type of concern about the exchange rate is rooted mainly in 
structural factors (openness, trade pattern, or more fundamentally, factor endowments and 
comparative advantage), then the question remains as to how easy it is for such economies to rid 
themselves of this vulnerability. 
                                                       
35    The existing empirical literature on this issue, taken as a whole, appears to be inconclusive regarding the impact of 
exchange rate variability on trade. However, Calvo and Reinhart (2000b) contend that there is more conclusive evidence on 
the negative impact on trade if one differentiates between the studies on emerging markets and those on industrial 
economies. 
36   In line with the “local currency pricing” argument, if emerging market exports to industrial countries are priced in major 
foreign currencies, exchange rate movements will affect not so much competitiveness per se, but export earnings in 
domestic currency terms and profitability. Dominguez and Tesar (2001) find that profits of non-US firms (in both industrial 
and emerging market economies) are significantly exposed to exchange rate fluctuations, in contrast to the findings in 
earlier studies that focused mainly on US firms. However, they find it difficult to identify factors that can systematically 
explain the direction of exposure, suggesting a certain intricacy in the relationship between exchange rate and firms’ 
competitiveness and profitability. 12 
   
2.3 Financial  stability 
Policymakers have reason to be concerned that exchange rate fluctuations can destabilise an 
economy’s financial system. The relationship between the exchange rate and financial fragility has 
received increased attention in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. Earlier work on this issue tended to 
focus mainly on the dangers of fixed but adjustable, so-called “soft”, pegs. However, more generally, 
both pegged and flexible exchange rate regimes can in fact exhibit vulnerabilities in the face of strong 
capital flows. The connection between the exchange rate and financial fragility is a complex and 
multidimensional one. 
This subsection considers two main aspects. The first concerns the impact of real exchange rate 
misalignments on the financial system’s vulnerability to capital flow reversals.
37  We will argue that 
underlying imbalances can build up even under a flexible exchange rate regime. The second relates to 
a financial system’s vulnerability to large exchange rate movements when foreign currency liabilities 
figure prominently in the system. This is the currency mismatch problem, often discussed under the 
headings of “financial dollarisation” and the so-called “original sin”. 
Real exchange rate misalignment and vulnerability to reversal of capital flows 
Concern for an unsustainable rise in the currency ultimately leading to financial instability is based on 
the following stylised sequence. A real appreciation associated with large capital inflows can go hand 
in hand with a rapid credit expansion and increase in asset prices, leading to an investment boom and 
asset price bubble. This overextension of the domestic financial system in turn makes the economy 
vulnerable to a slowdown - or even a reversal - of capital inflows. The real appreciation in the build-up 
phase can also adversely affect export competitiveness and investment in the external sector (see 
Section 2.2), while weighing on the current account, which in turn can leave the economy even more 
vulnerable to what Calvo (1998) calls the “sudden stop” problem. 
A subsequent collapse of asset prices can erode the balance sheets of banks and non-banks alike. 
Moreover, a decline in the exchange rate in the face of capital outflows can hurt the solvency of firms 
and individuals with net foreign currency liabilities (see below). Widespread defaults may ensue. The 
banking system, possibly subject to runs, can no longer finance borrowers as before. These financial 
consequences can also have real effects via the “credit channel”, as the decline in asset prices and 
credit quality makes it difficult for firms to borrow and invest.
38  Wealth effects and unemployment can 
take a toll on consumption as the current account adjusts via import compression. Calvo and Reinhart 
(1999, 2000b) show that recent episodes of capital reversal have been more severe in emerging 
markets and their consequences more costly.
39 
The earlier experiences in Latin America (eg Chile in the 1980s) and later in East Asia in the run-up to 
the Asian crisis provide classic examples of how a real exchange rate misalignment could impinge on 
financial stability. This linkage between the exchange rate and financial fragility has often been 
portrayed as a typical consequence of exchange rate pegs, in combination with inflation inertia. One 
conclusion of this line of thought is a call to abandon exchange rate pegs and to allow the exchange 
rate to float, as this may serve to limit the capital inflow. 
                                                       
37   This is reminiscent of the classic credit boom and twin crises stories often featured in the crisis literature of the 1990s; see, 
for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
38   There is a large body of research on the alternative channels of transmission of monetary contraction and on the real effects 
of bank panics and bankruptcies. Among the early contributors to the contemporary (post-1980) repertoire of this literature 
are Ben Bernanke, Charles Calomiris, Mark Gertler, Simon Gilchrist and Glenn Hubbard, to name just a few. 
39   They find that post-crisis current account adjustments are on average larger in the case of emerging market economies. 
They take this as an indication that emerging market economies are more prone to the sudden stop problem, often 
accompanied by a loss of access to international capital markets. The authors analyse the levels of sovereign credit ratings, 
the probabilities of downgrades and the magnitudes of downgrades accompanying crises to argue that emerging market 
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Balance of current account (lhs)1 Nominal effective exchange rate; 1999 Q1 = 100 (rhs) 
Real effective exchange rate; 1999 Q1= 100 (rhs)2







1 As a percentage of GDP.   2 CPI based; increasing values indicate appreciation.  
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS.
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However, real exchange rate misalignments are not a phenomenon unique to pegs. They can also 
occur under a flexible exchange rate regime when a trend nominal appreciation has somehow 
acquired a momentum of its own and is not sufficiently offset by a downward adjustment of domestic 
prices. In fact, more specifically, in a regime that successfully targets a non-negative rate of inflation, 
any nominal appreciation is a real appreciation.
40  
Recent cases of real appreciation in the context of flexible exchange rate regimes can be found in 
some countries in emerging Europe that are subject to expectations of convergence to the euro area. 
For instance, even though the koruna exchange rate is flexible, the Czech economy has nevertheless 
seen large capital inflows, rapid appreciation and considerable current account deficits (Graph 4). The 
picture is similar in Poland, where the zloty has been floating for some years already. In Hungary, real 
appreciation in fact accelerated after the forint was allowed in early 2001 to float within a much wider 
band, while the current account deficit widened at the same time. Elsewhere, for example in Mexico, 
significant real appreciation accompanied by persistent but more moderate current account deficits 
can also be observed. The worrisome combination of chronic current account deficits and an 
overvalued currency can also be found among industrial countries (eg the United States). 
True, the observation of real appreciation and current account deficit per se does not automatically 
imply the occurrence of financial stability problems. However, the main points here are three. First, 
getting rid of the exchange rate peg, the traditional villain, may not necessarily solve the problem after 
all - it may simply allow the appreciation-deficit combination to manifest itself differently. Second, to the 
extent that this combination has been a well tested leading indicator of financial crises over the years, 
there may be at least a potential cause for concern.
41  Third, since the vulnerability in question is likely 
to be compounded when the financial infrastructure is weaker or when the country credit rating is 
lower, many emerging market economies are arguably more at risk than are industrial countries.
42 
Currency mismatch 
Currency mismatches of banks or more often non-banks can deal a further blow to financial stability in 
the event of a sharp adjustment of the exchange rate.
43 A naïve view is that a currency mismatch 
exists when an entity’s balance sheet contains unequal amounts of foreign currency assets and 
liabilities. While this is stated symmetrically, the case that is typically of concern is the combination of 
net foreign currency liabilities and a depreciation of the domestic currency, as seen in the Asian, 
Turkish and Argentine crises.
44  More realistically, currency mismatch ought to be understood as a 
situation in which the profile of actual or potential foreign currency commitments is insufficiently 
matched by the profile of actual and potential foreign currency cash flow available at the 
corresponding time horizon. Thus, intertwined with currency denomination is also the issue of maturity 
and liquidity.
45 
                                                       
40   A related but more general point is made by Borio and Lowe (2002a), who argue that low and stable inflation may in fact 
increase the likelihood that excess demand pressures show up first in credit aggregates and asset prices, rather than in 
goods and services prices. This would suggest that, without other complementary measures to address persistent nominal 
exchange rate trends or the resulting financial imbalances, a single-minded pursuit of low and stable inflation could, 
ironically, put financial stability more at risk. 
41   See, for example, Kaminsky et al (1998). 
42   Empirical analysis by Borio and Lowe (2002b) suggests that even taking into account the credit and asset price gaps (ie 
deviations from trend), the real exchange rate gap has more information content for predicting banking crises in emerging 
market economies than in industrial economies. 
43   The “third generation” crisis literature that sprang up after the 1997-98 Asian crisis highlights this as a main factor behind the 
particularly destructive effects of recent exchange rate devaluations in emerging markets. See, for example, Aghion et al 
(1999), Krugman (1999), Chang and Velasco (1999), Céspedes et al (2000). 
44   A rapid appreciation of the domestic currency can also potentially cause adverse balance sheet effects when there is a 
substantial  positive position on net foreign currency assets (eg central banks that have accumulated a lot of foreign 
reserves). The Central Bank of China, with its strong foreign reserve position, faced technical insolvency with the 
appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar in 1988. However, this particular incident had little in the way of economic 
consequences. In a more recent example, the Czech National Bank faces the same potential concern in the light of the 
persistent strength of the koruna and the high share of foreign reserves on its balance sheet. 
45   See, for example, Hawkins and Turner (2000). 16 
   
But why do such mismatches arise? One view is “moral hazard”: the existence of some kind of implicit 
guarantee (eg an exchange rate peg, government bailout) relieves, or is thought to relieve, lenders 
and borrowers of the currency risk. As a result, lenders tend to lend excessively and borrowers find it 
profitable to borrow unhedged.
46  A second view is the so-called “original sin”: borrowers simply cannot 
borrow in domestic currency, especially long term, because no lender at home or abroad is willing to 
extend credit so denominated. In other words, the market for lending in domestic currency is missing 
or severely underdeveloped and thus it is impossible (or extremely costly) for the borrower to hedge.
47 
Regardless of the root cause, currency mismatches can leave the wealth or even solvency of an entity 
exposed to the movements in the exchange rate. However, with respect to the implications for 
financial stability, more specifically, some subtleties apply. 
If the banking sector itself is mismatched, then the implications are straightforward. The Turkish 
currency and banking crisis in 2001 is a case in point. However, even if the banks themselves do not 
appear to be mismatched, they may still be exposed if they hold foreign currency claims on borrowers 
that are mismatched.
48  This is the case of the Asian crisis, where banks had made dollar loans to 
firms that did not have dollar cash flows. Currency risk manifested itself as credit risk.
49  The impact of 
the devaluation in 1999 on the Brazilian corporate sector was eased by the government’s offering of 
various forms of currency protection prior to the devaluation. However, the resulting increase in public 
debt, its compounding since and the subsequent slide of the real have all combined to put the 
sustainability of the government’s finances in doubt. The 2002 Argentine crisis offers another example 
of a mismatch in the government, corporate and household sectors, not the banking sector per se, 
posing a threat to financial stability. 
Thus, the aggregate amount of foreign currency claims alone does not necessarily tell the whole story; 
the distribution of these claims among different sectors and the interconnections thereof also matter. 
Accordingly, the currency mismatch problem is also linked to financial infrastructure issues, such as 
prudential and supervision systems, capital adequacy and risk management practices. 
Some recent studies have focused on currency mismatches as a factor behind the apparent 
reluctance of many emerging market economies to tolerate large exchange rate fluctuations. For 
example, Hausmann et al (2000, 2001) use BIS international financial statistics to illustrate emerging 
market economies’ general lack of ability to borrow internationally in domestic currency. They also 
report a strong positive relationship between the inability to borrow (“original sin”) and the apparent 
reluctance of emerging market economies - particularly the more advanced ones - to take a 
completely hands-off approach towards the exchange rate (“float with life jacket”).
50  While not 
intending to dismiss the significance of the currency mismatch issue, we contend that this analysis is, 
at this stage, still open to challenge, not least because of the difficulties of properly measuring 
currency mismatches (see Box A). 
                                                       
46   Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) test three views of the relationship between exchange rate and financial fragility - moral 
hazard, original sin and the commitment problem - in order to understand better its nature. Not surprisingly, they find that no 
single hypothesis works in all cases. However, the authors do express scepticism over the view that fixed exchange rate 
discourages hedging (or that more exchange rate flexibility encourages hedging). 
47   This could be due to a lack of policy credibility: no lender at home or abroad is willing to hold claims denominated in a poorly 
managed currency with deteriorating purchasing power. Alternatively, it could also be due to efficiency reasons: it is more 
efficient for lenders and borrowers from different countries to deal with each other in a few major international currencies 
rather than a host of exotic currencies. In any case, moral hazard is not the issue. Some theoretical contributions along this 
line include, for example Chamon (2001) and Aghion et al (2001). Related are some studies that seek to explain the 
phenomenon of “financial dollarisation”, for example Ize and Levy Yeyati (2002) and Honohan and Shi (2002). The intuition 
here is that under certain configurations of macroeconomic and financial factors, the volatility of the purchasing power of 
domestic currency claims would be higher, so that both lenders and borrowers would prefer to denominate claims in foreign 
currencies in order to minimise such volatility. 
48   Robert Aliber, Professor at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, calls these “peso loans in drag”. 
49   Goldstein (2002), Chapter 7, discusses this point. However, sometimes this point can be overdrawn. Cho and McCauley 
(2003) show that the dollarisation of the Korean corporate sector’s debt at end-1996 was similar to the export to GDP ratio, 
suggesting that in aggregate at least there was not a prima facie case of currency mismatch. Accounting solvency may 
appear compromised, even if foreign currency debt is well matched by cash flows. 
50   Faia and Monacelli (2002) provide a theoretical basis for such an observation. They show that in the presence of high 
“financial exposure” (ie borrowing in foreign currency), the acclaimed insulating role of a flexible exchange rate tends to 
diminish, overwhelmed by the negative balance sheet effect. This in turn leads to an aversion to exchange rate fluctuations.  
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BOX A: Measuring “original sin”? 
Apart from the imperfections of the indicators used to capture the manner or degree of “floating”, 
perhaps even more problematic are the indicators used to measure currency mismatch (often 
interpreted as a reflection of “original sin”). 
Hausmann et al (2000, 2001) try to measure the extent of currency mismatch by using three different 
definitions of the “ability to borrow” internationally in domestic currency. ABILITY1 is defined as the 
ratio between the stock of international debt securities issued by a country in its own currency and the 
total stock of international securities issued by the country in all currencies. ABILITY2 is defined as the 
ratio between the sum of debt securities and bank loans in the borrowing country’s own currency and 
total securities and loans. ABILITY3 is the ratio between the stock of securities issued in a given 
currency (regardless of the nationality of the issuer) and the total amount of securities issued by the 
corresponding country. In all three definitions, a lower ratio is taken to mean a lower “ability to borrow” 
in domestic currency, which the authors in turn interpret as a higher degree of currency mismatch. 
To illustrate a few potential problems with this approach, we reproduce in Table 6 the indicator 
ABILITY1 for multiple years. We also construct a new indicator that is the “bank loans” version of 
ABILITY1. This exercise can show more transparently what goes on behind debt securities and bank 
loans, respectively, while at the same time remaining comparable to Hausmann et al. Our key 
observations are as follows: 
First, Hausmann et al compute and use only the 1998-99 average “ability to borrow” in their analysis. 
However, as seen in our calculations, this indicator does vary somewhat over time. For example, the 
share of Thailand’s domestic currency denominated international bonds outstanding in 2001 increased 
to levels comparable to those for Australia and Canada. This raises the question of whether the strong 
results of Hausmann et al are robust through time. 
Second, the “ability” indicator also shows variations across debt instruments. For example, emerging 
market economies generally have a higher share of domestic currency denominated borrowings in 
loans than in bonds, while the reverse is true in the United Kingdom and the euro area. 
Third, although emerging markets do generally have a comparatively lower proportion of their 
borrowings denominated in domestic currencies, there are some notable exceptions. For example, 
New Zealand and Sweden have very low shares of domestic currency denominated international 
bonds (but not loans), while the United Kingdom has rather low shares of domestic currency 
denominated international loans (but not bonds). 
Both the second and third points raise the question of whether this type of indicator might in fact reflect 
only the ex post choice of currency denomination rather than the ex ante ability to borrow in domestic 
currency. 
Fourth, these aggregate measures do not acknowledge the distribution of currency positions across 
different sectors within the debtor economy. 
Last but not least, even if it is possible to break down the data by borrowing sectors, this type of 
indicator is not really proof of “mismatch” since it refers only to the international (cross-border) 
liabilities of the debtors but says nothing about their assets. It also does not provide any information on 
local (within-border) cross-sector holding of claims or on prospective foreign currency cash flows. 
In short, the indicators used by Hausmann et al may in fact capture neither the problem of currency 
mismatch nor even the ability to borrow in domestic currency. This is why we contend that there is still 
room for challenge - not so much to overturn the presumption that emerging market economies tend to 
have difficulties borrowing internationally in domestic currencies, nor to dismiss the possibility that 
indebtedness in foreign currency exacerbates one’s concern about exchange rate fluctuations, but to 
find better ways of measuring currency mismatch. 18 
   
Even if one is convinced of the existence of a strong connection between the inability to borrow in 
domestic currency and the preference to stabilise the exchange rate, what still remains open is the 
interpretation of this connection. After all, the propensity to denominate claims in foreign currencies 
that prevails in some emerging market economies may not be a separate phenomenon in and of itself, 
but a symptom of broader circumstances. For instance, in Section 2.1, we cited the finding by 
Honohan and Shi (2002) of a strong relationship between “financial dollarisation” and exchange rate 
pass-through among emerging market economies.
51  In this case, a policy of exchange rate 
management could be interpreted not necessarily as one of protecting the capital of firms, households 
or governments carrying currency mismatches, but simply one of stabilising inflation. Furthermore, if 
one accepts the view that a history of high inflation tends to raise the sensitivity of inflation to the 
exchange rate, then the so-called “original sin” is not really a sin before the lifetime but rather the sin of 
a lifetime, namely the result of chronic inflation. Thus, an alternative hypothesis is that the experience 
of trimming zeros off the local currency leads to both dollarisation and high pass-through, and the 
latter forces policymakers to stabilise the exchange rate. 
Currency mismatch is a complex issue that deserves a fuller treatment than the space allowed in this 
paper. But the bottom line is that regardless of whether the currency mismatch problem comes down 
to dependence on foreign funds, missing or underdeveloped markets, prudential and risk management 
practices, or a history of inflation, emerging market economies are likely to be more at risk than are 
industrial economies. Conscious efforts to reduce the occurrence of currency mismatch should help 
provide relief in the longer run,
52 but until then, there may still be a very legitimate concern over the 
effect of exchange rate fluctuation on financial stability. 
2.4  Volatility and FX market liquidity 
As discussed above, large changes and/or persistent trends in the exchange rate can be a cause for 
concern with respect to macroeconomic and financial stability. However, in terms of everyday 
monitoring and management, policymakers often emphasise their worries about short-term exchange 
rate volatility.
53  The main reasons why policymakers may want to pay explicit attention to short-term 
exchange rate volatility are either a combination of macro- and microeconomic concerns or are entirely 
microeconomic in nature. 
For the authorities that seek to limit daily exchange rate fluctuations, there is probably both a concern 
that foreign exchange markets are subject to perverse market dynamics that can have macroeconomic 
costs and a conviction that the surest way to counter these threats is by limiting daily fluctuations. The 
former (pre-1995) Canadian policy of limiting daily exchange rate movements could be interpreted in 
this light. By limiting the payoffs to speculative activities in US dollars/Canadian dollars, the policy 
could be seen as trying to reduce the chance of the exchange rate causing trouble for inflation or 
export competitiveness (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
54 
There are also purely microeconomic concerns. In small foreign exchange markets, excessive 
exchange rate volatility may contribute to “disorderly” and illiquid market conditions,
55 typically 
                                                       
51   It should be noted that dollarisation (defined here as foreign currency deposits held as a percentage of M2) can be related 
to, but may not always have a one-to-one correspondence with, the inability to borrow in domestic currency. For instance, 
financially liberal or sophisticated economies offer residents means to diversify their portfolio to include assets of different 
currencies. In this sense, having a lot of foreign currency liabilities (deposits) has little to do with the inability to issue debt in 
domestic currency. Conversely, an observed low degree of dollarisation may only be a reflection of an underdeveloped or 
repressed financial system, which in turn does not necessarily imply an absence of “original sin”. 
52   This is one aspect of the “plus” in the “managed floating plus” regime proposal by Goldstein (2002). 
53   Short-term exchange rate volatility and market functioning are certainly not new as a practical concern of central bankers or 
as an area of research. However, these issues have thus far received relatively little attention in the line of research that 
seeks to explain why some economies appear reluctant to see large exchange rate fluctuations. 
54   This practice of limiting daily exchange rate fluctuation ended in 1995. Murray et al (1996) argue that their empirical analysis 
provides, in the main, little support for the excess volatility argument in the case of Canada and thus the need for 
government intervention. They also argue that the foreign exchange market is performing more or less as it should and is 
not in any obvious need of remedial government action. 
55   It should be noted that the relationship between volatility and liquidity is not always straightforward. Liquidity should be 
assessed by putting volatility in relations to other indicators (eg turnover) as well. See, for example, Galati’s and Breedon’s 
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characterised by wide bid-ask spreads and “gapping” (successive transaction prices outside the 
previous bid-ask spread, that is, sudden jumps in prices). However, in practice, the precise working 
definition of “disorder” may well be country-specific, depending on the policymaker’s objectives and 
preferences. Furthermore, small and illiquid foreign exchange markets may also be prone to suffer 
from the absence of “two-way risk” (ie when market participants tend to be on one side of the market 
with few willing to take the other side). Under such circumstances, expectations of a “one-way bet” 
may generate market dynamics that tend to exaggerate exchange rate movements. 
Over the longer term, frequent occurrences of “disorder” may carry unfavourable implications for the 
development of the financial system.
56  From the policymaker’s perspective, illiquid or “disorderly” 
markets can affect the feasibility and effectiveness of market-oriented operating procedures. Market 
functioning also affects the validity of information exactable from market exchange rates and related 
asset prices (eg market expectations, assessment and pricing of risk) for the purpose of monetary and 
prudential policies. From the private sector’s point of view, the lack of market liquidity is likely to 
complicate - if not distort - agents’ pricing, trading and risk management practices, all of which could in 
turn affect market liquidity. 
Two pieces of evidence suggest that foreign exchange markets in emerging economies have typically 
been less liquid than their counterparts in the industrial world. First, despite the rapid growth in activity 
during the 1990s, foreign exchange markets in most emerging economies continue to be relatively 
small (Table 7). An exception at the time of the last Triennial Survey was South Africa, where turnover 
as a fraction of output in April 2001 was comparable to that of more mature markets.
57  Second, bid-
ask spreads among emerging market currencies appear to be less uniform (both across currencies 
and across time) and in general wider than those among industrial country currencies (Table 8a). This 
suggests a higher susceptibility to a sudden withdrawal of liquidity. In contrast, industrial country 
currencies, perhaps with the exception of the New Zealand dollar, the Swedish krona and occasionally 
the yen, tend to have average bid-ask spreads well below 0.1%, even during periods of market 
turbulence (Table 8b).
58 
As will be detailed further in Section 3, in practice, economies could tolerate or even welcome an 
adjustment in level of the exchange rate (especially if it is consistent with the restoring of internal and 
external balance),
59 but draw a distinction between “orderly” and “disorderly” adjustments. And if the 
propensity for “disorder” is partly related to market size, then even with generous measures of 
improving the mechanical aspects of market functioning, most emerging market currencies are still 
unlikely to attain the status, and hence turnover, of major international currencies. Thus, there is a 
case for better monitoring of market conditions and even policy action. There have been instances of 
policy reactions that focus mainly on smoothing the functioning of the foreign exchange and related 
markets, rather than on affecting inflation or external competitiveness per se. 
2.5 Summing  up 
The apparent reluctance for some economies to take a completely hands-off approach to the 
exchange rate may be neither an irrational fear nor an unconditional distaste for “floating” per se. 
There are many good reasons for any open economy to be concerned about certain types or 
magnitudes of exchange rate movements. In this section, we have reviewed the influence of the 
exchange rate on inflation, the external sector, financial stability and market functioning. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contributions in BIS Papers, no 2 (2001). For a broader discussion on market liquidity, see, for example, CGFS (1999, 
2001). 
56   Borio (2000) points out that this is one reason why market liquidity has been attracting increasingly more attention. 
57   Nonetheless, the Commission of Inquiry into the Rapid Depreciation of the Exchange Rate of the Rand reported some 
evidence of a decline in transaction volume over the course of 2001. 
58   See also Galati (2000) for a description of how liquidity in the markets for the baht, rupiah, real and Mexican peso evolved 
between 1995 and 2000. 
59   Graph 4 above shows several cases in which nominal depreciation, translated into real depreciation, could be a welcomed 
phenomenon in the sense of bringing relief to the persistent current account deficit, eg Brazil, Australia, New Zealand. 20 
   
One main observation is that emerging market economies tend to be more vulnerable on all four fronts 
compared to industrial economies. Furthermore, we have examined how both structural and historical 
factors such as income level, openness, trade pattern, inflation and crisis history, policy track record, 
and the state of market structure and development relate to the relatively greater vulnerability of 
emerging market economies to exchange rate fluctuations. 
A consequence of this observation is that policymakers in emerging market economies can be 
expected to be more concerned about the exchange rate than are their industrial country counterparts. 
Accordingly, exchange rate considerations are likely to figure more prominently in emerging market 
economies, regardless of the specific policy regime. Under inflation targeting in particular, the most 
obvious reason for concern is likely to be inflation. However, the important point here is that 
policymakers may and often do care about the exchange rate for reasons above and beyond its 
immediate consequences on inflation. 
Is the current relatively disadvantaged position of emerging market economies an immutable reality? 
Our examination of the underlying factors suggests not necessarily. To the extent that some 
vulnerabilities are related to factors such as inflation history or the underdevelopment of market 
infrastructures, there may be hope for relief if, over time, inflation outcomes improve, policy credibility 
consolidates and markets develop and mature. That said, however, one should recall that since 
vulnerabilities can also be due to less alterable structural factors such as openness, trading pattern, or 
the mere fact of not being a major economic power, some concerns are likely to persist. As a result, 
policy response to safeguard against adverse exchange rate developments will always be necessary 
and desirable. Indeed, this point may be applicable not only to emerging market economies but also to 
some relatively open industrial economies such as Sweden and Switzerland, as will be further 
illustrated in the next section. 
3.  Experience and policy response 
Given the observations in Section 2, one would expect the exchange rate to evoke relatively more 
concern in emerging market economies, regardless of the specific policy regime. However, zooming in 
on the case of inflation targeting in particular, one might ask how exactly exchange rate fluctuations 
have entered into the policy scenarios faced by inflation targeting countries. How have policymakers in 
turn dealt with the exchange rate under this specific policy framework? A review of the recent 
experience and policy choices of our sample countries will help shed light on these questions. 
This section first takes stock of the collective experience of our 18 inflation targeting economies in 
1998 to 2002. A simple statistical exercise provides evidence to suggest that exchange rate 
movements did appear to be a challenge to the pursuit of inflation targets - more so in emerging 
market economies than in industrial economies. We then turn to specific cases to examine the variety 
of interactions between exchange rates and inflation targeting that have arisen and the policy actions 
taken. This exercise reveals that the “strict constructionist” view mentioned in the introduction does not 
prevail: in practice, policymakers do care about more than the exchange rate’s influence on inflation 
per se. Tensions among different objectives may sometimes arise. As for the measures taken in 
response, practice again proves much more diverse than that suggested by the conventional 
discussions of inflation targeting: apart from monetary policy, official foreign exchange intervention and 
capital controls have also been used. We consider the three categories of policy options in turn, 
illustrating with examples drawn from the recent experience (mainly 2000 to 2002) of our sample 
countries. 
3.1 Experience 
During the period under review, several background developments were at work to affect emerging 
market currencies and some industrial country currencies as well. It was the time of the across-the-
board strengthening of the US dollar (up to early 2002) and repeated bouts of weakening of the yen 
(especially in late 2000 and early 2002), which caused particular concerns for Asian economies. 2001 
saw the outbreak and the aftermath of the Turkish crisis and the building-up of the Argentine crisis. In 
the first half of 2002, there were the collapse of the Argentine economy and the heightened economic 
and political tensions in Latin America. In contrast, the economic conditions in emerging Europe, given 
the prospects of accession to the European Union, were relatively buoyant. The period under review  
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also saw turbulences in equity markets worldwide and the turn in the business cycles (and the 
uncertainty thereof) in major economies. 
Experience to date with inflation targeting in emerging markets suggests that it has been more difficult 
for emerging market economies to hit their targets, notwithstanding the fact that these targets have 
been specified more broadly in the first place. If we consider the years 1998 through 2002, our dozen 
emerging market inflation targeters have collectively gone through 43 target years.
60  Of those years, 
inflation has not come in within the target about half the time, ie 22 years. Mexico and Thailand are the 
only countries in our emerging market sample with a 4-5 year record of target hits. By contrast, among 
the six industrial country inflation targeters, there were only nine missed target years out of a total of 




Inflation target hits and misses (1998-2002) 
 Emerging  market  Industrial   
Hits  21 19  40 
Misses  22 9  31 
 43  28  71 
Chi-square test statistic = 2.49 (p-value = 0.114) 
 
Admittedly, our method of counting is somewhat mechanical since some central banks aim at fulfilling 
the target over the cycle (eg Australia) rather than year by year, and some inflation outcomes missed 
the target by no more than a whisker. Indeed, some misses might not have been altogether 
unwelcome (eg Korea’s undershooting of the target in 1998 and 1999). That said, the mean absolute 
miss for the emerging market economies is about 2 percentage points, while that for the industrial 
economies is only about 1 percentage point. This contrast is all the more remarkable against the fact 
that the emerging market targeters have generally given themselves on average a wider target to hit 
(2.7 versus 1.6 percentage points). 
At the same time, emerging market inflation targeters have also experienced larger exchange rate 
fluctuations. We sort year-on-year changes in the effective exchange rate into three categories: large 
appreciations (≥ +10%), large depreciations (≤ -10%) and changes of less than 10% in absolute terms. 
To take into account the possible lags in exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices, we 
calculated year-on-year changes using three different time frames: the calendar year, third quarter in 
previous year to third quarter in target year, and second quarter in previous year to second quarter in 
target year. Figure 2 below shows that our sample of emerging market countries experienced large 
annual effective exchange rate swings (Q2-to-Q2) in about a third of their inflation targeting years 
between 1998 and 2002, more frequently than did industrial countries. In both groups, large 
depreciations were more common than large appreciations (see Annex Figure 1, also derived from 
Table 9, for a contingency tree view). Considering exchange rate changes over the calendar year or 
only with a one-quarter lag results in similar observations.
62 
                                                       
60   We count partial years of inflation targeting (eg if the regime was introduced in the middle of the calendar year) as full years. 
61   We follow quite literally the inflation target definitions as announced by the central banks. In case of a point target, we 
consider the target missed when actual inflation exceeds the point target by ±1 percentage point. In case of a target range 
(or a point plus tolerance band or a one-sided range ≤ x%), we considered the target missed when actual inflation is either 
above or below the literal boundaries of the target range. 
62   These two sets of results are not shown in this paper but are available from the authors upon request. We have more 
confidence in the validity of the results when using lagged exchange rate changes. This is because if the logic we want to 
follow is that exchange rate affects inflation, then evaluating inflation performance against lagged changes in exchange rate 
will help avoid picking up instances of inflation affecting the exchange rate. But in any case, the magnitudes of most of the 
“large” exchange rate changes are so great that they cannot possibly be fully explained by inflation alone. 22 
   
 
Figure 2 
Effective exchange rate changes (1998-2002) 
 Emerging  market  Industrial   








Less than 10%  29 22  51 
 43  28  71 
Chi-square test statistic = 1.04 (p-value = 0.308) 
 
The risk posed by the exchange rate to emerging market countries’ pursuit of their inflation targets is 
evident when we juxtapose the record of hits and misses with the performance of the effective 
exchange rate. Of the 22 target misses by emerging market economies, 10 (45%) were associated 
with exchange rate moves of over 10% in the aggravating direction, ie six cases of overshooting 
associated with large depreciations and four cases of undershooting with large appreciations. By 
contrast, the industrial countries had only two out of nine (22%) target misses associated with such 
large exchange rate moves, both being cases of overshooting associated with depreciations. The 
details are shown in Figure 3 below (see Annex Figure 1 for a contingency tree view of the same). 
 
Figure 3 
Exchange rate and inflation target performance (1998-2002) 
Emerging market economies 
 Overshoot  On  target  Undershoot   
≤≤≤≤  -10%  6  1 2  9 
No large change  2 19 8  29 
≥≥≥≥ +10%  0 1 4  5 
 8  21  14  43 
Chi-square test statistic = 23.34 (p-value = 0.0001) 
Industrial economies 
 Overshoot  On  target  Undershoot   
≤≤≤≤  -10%  2  2 1  5 
No large change  3 16  3  22 
≥≥≥≥ +10%  0 1  0  1 
 5  19  4  28 
Chi-square test statistic = 2.835 (p-value = 0.5857) 
 
This result assumes the Q2-to-Q2 calculation of exchange rate changes. The difference in 
performance between the two country groups widens further if we use the calendar year or the one-
quarter lag time frame. Chi-square tests show that the null hypothesis that inflation target performance 
is independent of the direction and magnitude of exchange rate changes can be rejected in the 
emerging market sample, but not in the industrial country sample. 
This simple exercise may not be able to capture all the nuances of evaluating the role of the exchange 
rate in the pursuit of inflation targets; nonetheless, one can consider these figures prima facie 
evidence of the challenge posed by the exchange rate to emerging market inflation targeters.  
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3.2 Monetary  policy 
Monetary policy, typically taken to mean setting the policy interest rate, is the primary policy tool 
assigned to the pursuit of the inflation target. When then should interest rate policy respond to the 
exchange rate? In the specific context of inflation targeting, a logical starting point for deciding whether 
monetary policy action is needed would be to ask if the exchange rate development is carrying current 
or prospective inflation away from the announced target. We examine in this subsection the use of 
monetary policy under two main types of policy scenarios: (1) when the inflation target is under threat 
and (2) when inflation is not an immediate concern. We illustrate each case with some examples from 
2000 to 2002. The fact that we do observe policy scenarios of the second category confirms the view 
that strict inflation targeting (ie caring about inflation and inflation only) is not the norm in practice. 
Policymakers in at least some - if not all - inflation targeting countries do rank their objectives and 
make use of any available room for manoeuvre to attend to exchange rate related concerns apart from 
inflation. However, sometimes dilemmas may arise. 
When the inflation target is threatened 
If the exchange rate change threatens to move inflation outside its target, a monetary policy response 
is warranted. As noted above, recent episodes of significant exchange rate movements have proven to 
be a challenge for inflation targeting emerging economies. For example, an accelerated depreciation 
of the real from around March 2001 helped push inflation in Brazil above the upper tolerance limit (6%) 
of the target for the year. In response, the central bank reversed its previous monetary easing, raised 
interest rates aggressively for five consecutive months and maintained this tight stance until early 
2002 (Graph 5). Other cases of monetary tightening in response to the inflationary threat associated 
with episodes of significant currency weakness can be observed in, for example, Indonesia in 2000, 
South Africa in early 2002, and Israel in early 2002. 
Similar policy situations can also be found among inflation targeting industrial countries. For example, 
as the risk of inflation exceeding the 2% target in the one- to two-year horizon increased, Sveriges 
Riksbank raised the policy interest rate in July 2001, citing among other factors the weakness of the 
krona (Graph 6).
63 
And it is not only currency weakness that has been a problem. Currency strength can also cause 
concerns and evoke policy reactions. In Poland, for instance, the tendency of the zloty to appreciate 
coincided with a decline in inflation to below the targeted range in 2001. This prompted the central 
bank to ease policy over most of the year. A similar scenario can also be seen in the Czech Republic 
in 2002. 
A general point to be made here is that the nature of the policy response depends very much on the 
setting of the inflation target. For instance, Mexico has rather ambitious disinflation objectives. It set 
inflation targets for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 at 13%, 10%, 6.5%, 4.5% and 3%, respectively. 
The Bank of Mexico maintained a tightening stance in 2001, even though the peso was strong and the 
disinflation path was well on track. The central bank widened the “corto” (ie signalled a tightening 
stance) six times from 2000 onwards (except July 2001) before easing again in April 2002.
64 
When inflation is not the immediate concern 
If current and prospective inflation performance is within the inflation target range, the policymaker is, 
in principle, free to use monetary policy to address other concerns, including those generated by 
exchange rate fluctuations. For example, after a year of keeping the policy rate constant, the Czech 
National Bank resumed policy easing in early 2001 against the backdrop of a still strong koruna, 
slowing economic growth and a wide trade deficit. It did so even though inflation had already risen 
back into the announced target range (Graph 5). The Hungarian central bank also began to lower 
interest rates in November and December 2002 to ease the tightened monetary conditions 
 
                                                       
63   This monetary policy move came after a series of interventions in June 2001 in support of the krona (see Section 3.3). 
64   This vigilance turned out to be not overdone. As the peso began to give back some strength in the second and third quarters 
of 2002, inflationary pressure once again became the focus. The Bank of Mexico tightened policy again in September.  24 
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Inflation (lhs)1 Policy rate (lhs)2  
Exchange rate (rhs)3
Inflation target (lhs)  
 






1 For South Africa, CPI-X (CPI excluding mortgage interest cost); for the Czech Republic, headline inflation (prior to 2002,
net inflation); for Korea, core CPI (prior to 2000, headline CPI); for Thailand, core CPI; for all others, headline CPI.  2 For
Brazil, Selic target rate; for Chile, nominal overnight target rate (prior to August 2001, real rate); for Israel, headline rate; 
for South Africa, repo rate; for the Czech Republic, two-week repo rate; for Poland, 28-day repo rate; for Korea, overnight 
call target rate; for Thailand, 14-day repo target rate.    3 Domestic currency per US dollar; for the Czech Republic and 
Poland, against the euro; monthly averages. 
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Inflation (lhs)1 Policy rate (lhs)2  
Exchange rate (rhs)3
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Inflation targets, policy rates and exchange rates 
Graph 6
Switzerland Sweden
1 Headline CPI.  2 For Sweden, repo rate; for Switzerland, actual three-month Libor rate shown, but policy stance expressed  
as the target range for this interest rate; prior to 2000, lombard rate.  3 Domestic currency per euro; monthly averages.
Source: National data.
 
associated with the strengthening forint, even though there was no imminent risk of inflation falling 
below target. The rate cuts also served to preserve the ± 15% exchange rate band, which is seen as 
consistent with the projected inflation targets and the prospective accession to EMU.
65 
Again, the setting of the inflation target can influence the nature and scope of the policy response. For 
example, in Thailand, the relatively wide inflation target range (0-3.5%) leaves considerable room for 
policymakers to attend to non-inflation objectives. The policy rate increase in June 2001, while inflation 
was still within the lower half of the target range, was officially explained as a technical adjustment to 
correct for a misalignment in the domestic short-term interest rate structure.
66  In the event, after 
weakening to over THB 45 per dollar (the weakest since 1998) in mid-2001, the baht regained strength 
in the second half of 2001. The central bank then began to lower interest rates at year-end amid 
concerns over weak export demand and growth, while inflation continued drift down but still within the 
target range. 
There is also the issue of setting priorities under extreme circumstances. For instance, in Brazil, 
against the backdrop of heightening domestic and regional tensions, the central bank began to cut 
interest rates in early 2002 (February and March) to address growth and debt concerns, even though 
inflation had already breached the target for the year. The central bank cut rates again in July, despite 
a renewed decline of the real to all-time lows. This can be interpreted as an example of other 
objectives taking precedence at times of emergency. Alternatively, it might have been hoped that small 
interest rate cuts from high levels would point to improvements in growth prospects and debt 
sustainability that might in turn help strengthen the currency.
67 
                                                       
65   At the time of the rate cuts, the euro exchange rate was around HUF 236, stronger than what was considered by the 
Monetary Council to be compatible with the 2003 and 2004 inflation targets (HUF 238-242) and very close to the strong 
edge of the trading band (around HUF 234). A reduction in domestic interest rates was seen as justified, especially in the 
light of the European Central Bank’s rate cut in early December and Hungary’s accession to the European Union. 
66   A policy statement accompanying this particular decision is not among the collection of policy statements on the Bank of 
Thailand website. Nonetheless, the rationale behind the 8 June policy rate increase can be found in the July 2001 Inflation 
Report. Since the end of 1998, the overnight interbank rate had been standing below the deposit rates of Thai commercial 
banks. The central bank viewed this “misalignment” as having “impaired the efficiency of the financial system”. Thus, it was 
decided to adjust the policy rate (14-day repo) in an attempt to guide the overnight rate upward and “establish a more 
appropriate interest rate structure in the money market”. The same report also refers to the “risks of excessive net outflows 
in the capital account”. 
67   With hindsight, the inflation target turns out to be too optimistic with respect to the environment. In June 2002, the central 
bank decided to revise its inflation target for 2003 from 3.25% to 4% (plus tolerance band) and set 3.75% for 2004. A more 
realistic inflation target notwithstanding, the political and economic conditions in Brazil continued to pose difficulties for 
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Monetary response to exchange rate related concerns other than inflation is also observed in industrial 
countries. For example, Switzerland lowered the target range for the three-month Swiss franc Libor on 
several occasions in late 2001 (September and December) and early 2002 (May) explicitly in reaction 
to the rapid appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro at a time of declining economic growth 
and an absence of inflationary pressures (Graph 6). This combination of policy rate changes and 
open-mouth policy seems to be now the preferred approach of the Swiss monetary authorities, 
whereas direct intervention in the foreign exchange market, which was formerly the practice, has fallen 
into disuse for the time being. 
Another general point that can be raised in the light of these country experiences is that of 
communication. In all these cases, the policymaker’s intention to address exchange rate related 
concerns other than inflation was communicated to the public through, for example, the official 
statement accompanying each policy decision, the published minutes of the policy meeting or the 
inflation report. 
Potential dilemmas and fractional policy instruments 
There could be, however, situations in which the policymaker faces less clear-cut choices regarding 
the use of monetary policy. One potential dilemma is that, under some circumstances, inflation and 
exchange rate developments can be such that they call for opposite monetary policy action. In this 
case, using monetary policy to counter adverse exchange rate movements may in turn jeopardise the 
inflation target.
68  Admittedly, however, it is quite difficult to find a “pure” example of this type of 
scenario in our sample of inflation targeting countries in recent years.
69  This seems to suggest that 
either the occasion for such a dilemma has yet to arise, or that even though some countries are 
reputed to prefer to keep exchange rate fluctuations in check, they have not done so in such a way 
that violates the pursuit of their announced inflation objectives.
70 
A more fundamental concern is that, regardless of whether there is a dilemma, the effect of a change 
in the policy rate on the exchange rate is not always unambiguous. On the one hand, traditional 
economic reasoning would predict that monetary tightening, for example, ought to make the interest 
rate differential more supportive of the domestic currency.
71  But on the other hand, a tighter monetary 
policy may also be perceived as negative for relative economic growth prospects (and debt dynamics 
in some economies), in which case, capital inflows into equities - and thus the currency - may suffer.
72 
                                                                                                                                                                      
monetary policy in the run-up to the presidential elections in October. The decision to reverse course and raise the policy 
rate by 300 basis points in an extraordinary meeting on 14 October (followed by another 100 and 300 basis points on 20 
November and 18 December, respectively) is a clear indication of the adversity of the situation. 
68   For instance, if the domestic currency weakens when inflation happens to be low, then an attempt to support the exchange 
rate by interest rate increases may run the risk of pushing inflation below target. Alternatively, attempts to check the strength 
of the domestic currency by cutting the interest rate when inflation is high runs the risk of letting inflation rise above target. 
These are the scenarios envisioned by sceptics who question the willingness of emerging market inflation targeters to put 
their announced inflation target above all else, including their preference for exchange rate stability. 
69   To a casual observer, the June 2001 interest rate hike in Thailand may appear to be one possible example since inflation 
did trend down subsequently towards the lower bound of the target range. Nonetheless, inflation never fell below target and 
the central bank did lower interest rates again as pressure on the baht subsided later in the year. The two rate cuts in 
Hungary in late 2002 may also be interpreted as another possible case since the November 2002 Quarterly Report on 
Inflation did forecast some upside risk in 2003 inflation. Nonetheless, 2002 inflation was indeed on target and, judging by the 
central bank’s official statements, one really cannot say that the decisions were made without taking the future inflation 
targets into consideration, ie again not a clear case of reacting to the exchange rate at the expense of the inflation target. 
70   Another more common type of dilemma is of course the tension between the need to deal with inflation concerns and the 
need to attend to other objectives (eg growth, debt dynamics, financial stability). But this is a typical trade-off whenever 
there is more than one policy objective, not something unique to inflation targeting. Nonetheless, the implications on 
accountability may be different if achieving the inflation target has been billed as the only explicit objective of monetary 
policy. The extremely difficult policy environment that Brazil faced in 2001 and 2002 provides a clear example. 
71   This was the case in 2001, for example, for currencies such as the Hungarian forint and the Norwegian krone. The relatively 
high interest rates were cited as one of the factors behind the currencies’ attractiveness and strength. 
72   This second channel may dominate when bonds account for a relatively small portion of capital flows and when the absolute 
size of the interest rate differential is not very large. The euro/dollar exchange rate in 2001 is an example. The aggressive 
rates cuts by the Federal Reserve and the consequent narrowing (eventually negative) short-term interest rate differential 
were, at the time, interpreted as positive for US growth and for the dollar.  
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Evidently, policymakers cannot depend only on changing interest rates to counteract the influences of 
the exchange rate. The dilemmas and uncertainties that arise can sometimes be resolved by 
considering the use of “fractional” instruments. For example, if a longer-dated interest rate is used as 
the key policy rate (as in the Czech Republic, Poland and Thailand), there is relatively more freedom 
to permit the overnight rate to fluctuate in response to short-run speculative exchange rate pressures. 
In this sense, the very short-term interest rate becomes a fractional instrument.
73  Modifying reserve 
requirements on domestic currency and foreign currency bank deposits (as in the Philippines and also 
in Taiwan, China) is another possible fractional instrument. Of course, the policymaker may also 
consider employing alternatives such as official interventions (Section 3.3) and capital controls 
(Section 3.4). Conceptually, the policymaker’s choice is akin to an “assignment problem”, with policy 
instruments of different degrees of “power” being matched with policy objectives of different priority. 
3.3 Official  intervention 
Allowing for the possibility of official intervention provides an extra degree of flexibility. Verbal and 
sterilised interventions can be used to reinforce monetary policy, to foreshadow it, or even to avoid 
altering it when an immediate change in monetary policy is deemed unjustified.
74  This is one way to 
resolve certain types of policy dilemma. Compared to monetary policy, official intervention is a more 
“direct” instrument for tackling exchange rate related concerns and for pinpointing the source of the 
problem. In fact, explicitly forswearing intervention may inadvertently put the policymaker in a bind 
under some circumstances. 
Both verbal and sterilised interventions have been actively used in recent years by inflation targeting 
emerging market economies, as well as some of their industrial economy counterparts. These 
interventions were intended to complement their inflation targeting strategy or to address problems 
specific to the foreign exchange market. 
Verbal intervention 
Verbal intervention is a commonly used device for communicating the policymaker’s assessment of 
the situation with regard to the exchange rate and to signal policy intentions. For example, in the light 
of the koruna’s persistent strength in recent years, the Czech central bank has been public about its 
readiness to consider the option of intervention. The unconventional preannouncements of 
intervention operations in Brazil and Chile in 2001 can also be interpreted as a type of verbal 
intervention (in the sense of an expression of policy intention); but a key difference here is that the 
announcements were not only threats but were indeed followed through with action (see below). The 
Korean authorities approach their Japanese counterpart in terms of the frequency of their commentary 
on the exchange rate, including both the dollar/won and yen/won rates, with implied possible 
intervention. At times, as in April 2001, statements quite explicitly contemplate intervention. 
Instances of verbal interventions are also found among industrial countries, both inflation targeters and 
otherwise. For example, officials in Japan, Australia, Sweden and Switzerland have all openly 
commented on the adverse developments in their respective currencies in recent years. The 
occasional reiteration of the so-called “strong dollar policy” by US officials in the recent past can also 
be considered a kind of verbal intervention - or as a formulaic refusal to engage in any actual 
intervention. 
Curiously, the explicit forswearing of foreign exchange intervention by the authorities (perhaps 
intended as a demonstration of the “purity” of the floating regime) could in fact be considered a type of 
                                                       
73   However, if the policy rate is an overnight rate (as in Brazil, Chile and Korea), it may be difficult to allow the short-term 
market rate to deviate persistently from the policy rate target without being perceived as veering from the declared policy 
stance. Thus, the operational framework of monetary policy has implications for the central bank’s room for manoeuvre in 
the face of adverse exchange rate movements. 
74   There is also the possibility of unsterilised intervention; however, this in effect amounts to a change in monetary policy 
implemented via the foreign exchange market. As such, it does not in general increase the room for manoeuvre for central 
banks. One possible exception was the intervention of the Japanese authorities in September 2001. The Bank of Japan 
bought US dollars to keep the yen from strengthening. Some market participants interpreted the operation as facilitating the 
central bank’s task of getting yen liquidity into the system. 28 
   
verbal intervention, with possibly perverse effects under some circumstances. Denying the possibility 
that the central bank may step in at times of turmoil could in some sense encourage one-way bets 
(see Box B). 
Box B: Asymmetric intervention under inflation targeting: a cautionary tale 
The vulnerability that an asymmetric policy of intervention can cause in a country targeting inflation is 
illustrated by South Africa’s experience in 2001. In an attempt to rebuild net foreign exchange reserves 
after substantial sales of dollars during the mid-1998 weakening of the rand, the South African 
authorities commenced from late 1998 exclusively to buy dollars in the market, eventually publicly 
committing to this policy until October 2001. Essentially, the policy was to sell rand on rand strength. 
The policy was partially reversed in October 2001, when it was announced that further rebuilding of 
net reserves would occur only in conjunction with the sale of state assets to non-residents or foreign 
borrowing. The rand depreciated sharply in the following months, in the face of a variety of pressures, 
leading to the appointment of a presidential commission to investigate the recent weakness of the 
rand and related matters (“the Rand Commission”). The rand’s weakness in late 2001 was followed by 
inflation in early 2002 rising above the targeted range. In retrospect, the exchange rate and the 
exchange rate policy were significant to the fate of the first explicitly announced inflation goal. 
The background of this policy goes back to the period of economic sanctions against South Africa, 
when the country’s ability to borrow internationally was constrained. In this context and in the face of 
rand weakness, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) had sold dollars forward at favourable rates 
to forestall early repayment of foreign currency debts by state firms and to encourage new borrowing 
when possible. Later, forward transactions occurred in the foreign exchange market at market-
determined rates that reflected the difference between US dollar and rand interest rates. The excess 
of forward sales of dollars (“the forward book”) over the spot holding of foreign exchange reserves was 
dubbed the net open forward position (NOFP). Over the years, huge losses had accumulated on the 
NOFP. 
There is a long history of discussion of the wisdom of using the forward market for foreign exchange 
intervention. Keynes’ (1930) view was that forward transactions offered an ideal instrument for 
intervention because they would not be constrained by a particular stock of reserves and thus in 
principle could be effected without limit. Kindleberger (1973, p 298) took the contrary view that 
eventually market participants would want to see the colour of the central bank’s money and would 
refuse to roll over a maturing forward position. In modern practice, France is thought to have run up a 
large and undisclosed forward position in the defence of the franc in 1992-93. In the wake of the mid-
crisis disclosure of the forward position that the Thai authorities had run up in the defence of the baht 
before its floating in July 1997, an international standard of disclosure was adopted. This would show 
all the claims on foreign exchange reserves, including forward sales. 
Against this background, the SARB backed into an asymmetric intervention policy in 1998-99. The 
SARB had adopted a policy to disclose the NOFP and the disclosure in June 1998 that the NOFP had 
increased substantially added to pressure on the rand (Financial Stability Forum (2000), p 141). The 
SARB’s intervention took the NOFP up to USD 23 billion in August 1998 (about the level reached in 
1996), and it followed up by raising interest rates from 14% in June to 25.5% in August. It was argued 
that an increase in the forward book led to higher rand interest rates (Jonsson (2000)), although it was 
not clear whether the announcement of a rise in the forward book had a worse effect than an 
announcement of an equivalent drop in spot reserves would have had in another context. As the rand 
regained some stability in the fourth quarter of 1998, the SARB began to look for opportunities to 
reduce the forward book, as it had done following earlier increases. The key difference in 1998-2001 
was that a policy of only reducing, and never increasing, the forward book became an announced 
policy. By March 2000, the IMF Directors “welcomed the public statements by the monetary authorities 
reaffirming their intention to progressively reduce the NOFP with the intention ultimately of dismantling 
the forward book” (IMF (2000)). 
Inflation targeting was introduced on 6 April 2000. A year later, IMF Directors “commended the 
Reserve Bank for not intervening in the foreign exchange market except to buy foreign exchange to 
lower the NOFP” (IMF (2001)). 
Although aimed to remove a perceived vulnerability, this asymmetric policy of intervention created its 
own vulnerability. This can be best appreciated by an inspection of the distribution of daily changes of 




were more days of mild depreciation than mild appreciation. This is also the message of the mean and 
the median, which both show a very small depreciation. But for the present purposes, what is of more 
interest is that the days of substantial depreciation outnumber the days of substantial appreciation. 
Statistically, this is captured by the skewness. While it is not unusual for a debtor country’s currency to 
show this asymmetry, the intervention policy could only have heightened this underlying tendency by 



























1 South African rand per US dollar; positive changes indicate a rand depreciation; vertical lines 
indicate double standard deviation.
for the period 1 October 1998 to 12 October 2001
Distribution of daily exchange rate changes of the South African rand against the US dollar1
 
From a market participant’s point of view, the asymmetric intervention policy would serve to take some 
of the risk out of a short position in the rand, while leaving the risk in a long position. A value-at-risk 
measure (based on the standard deviation over the three years and an assumption of normality) would 
suggest that, on average over the three years, a USD 100 million position, long or short, would lose 
more than USD 1.3 million in a day in only one day out of 40. But if one examines the two tails of the 
distribution, it is evident that there were only half as many days showing losses above that threshold if 
one bet against the rand (ie, eight days when the rand strengthened by more than 1.3% despite the 
SARB’s tendency to buy dollars at such times) than there were if one bet in favour (ie, 17 days when 
the rand fell by more than 1.3% with no bid from the SARB). 
With this as background, it is easier to understand the sense of the somewhat hyperbolic statement of 
one market participant before the Rand Commission (Part D 14.4). As Dr Abedian said: 
“... The SARB’s single-minded focus was on eliminating the NOFP … This of course meant a one-
sided intervention in the spot market. The SARB was in principle selling rands and buying hard 
currency, thereby adding to the net demand for hard currency and putting downward pressure on the 
rand. Moreover, in pursuit of closing down its NOFP, the SARB seemed to be inclined to fully capture 
once-off inflows such as the De Beers deal, thereby eliminating any upward pressures on the value of 
the rand. This proved a consistent policy approach over the period 1999-2001. However, this 
approach had a significant impact on hardening positions against the currency. Speculative positions 
against the rand were therefore by and large risk free. In essence, most, if not all, market players 
believed that even the SARB was neither inclined nor in a position to do anything that would 
strengthen the currency” [emphasis added]. 
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Likewise the above graph helps one understand what Governor Mboweni described as a “sentiment 
that the rand’s value is a one-way bet” (Part D 14.6): 
“Given the losses on the forward book and negative perceptions from market participants and 
commentators on the one hand and the potential impact on the currency of reducing the forward book 
on the other, the Bank had a difficult choice to make. In the long-term interest of South Africa, it was 
decided to place emphasis on reducing the NOFP. The Bank had to buy foreign exchange as 
prudently as possible to close out the NOFP. It is quite possible, however, that this eminently 
defensible goal of reducing the NOFP could have contributed at times to the sentiment that the rand’s 
value is a one-way bet. To reiterate, the Bank was indeed conscious of this risk in pursuing its goal 
and strove to manage this risk by buying US dollars selectively ... 
“Had the Bank allowed the proceeds of these large corporate transactions to flow through the market, 
the rand could have appreciated significantly. The market had been expecting a sizeable amount of 
the foreign exchange proceeds accruing to South African shareholders to be sold off for rand in the 
market, which expectation initially provided some support for the rand. Upon confirmation that the bulk 
of such proceeds were to be the subject of a once-off transaction with the Bank, for the purpose of 
reducing the NOFP, market perceptions of rand weakness could have been reinforced.” 
Stepping back, two points can be made of relevance to South Africa’s experience and of possible use 
to other inflation targeting emerging markets. First, the authorities in inflation targeting countries have 
not generally eschewed sterilised intervention as a matter of policy. Even in New Zealand, where the 
practice of non-intervention preceded the first adoption of inflation targeting by some four years, the 
authorities never said never. Moreover, not only did the government maintain reserves by rolling over 
its borrowing, but also, according to ex-governor Don Brash, the Reserve Bank thought hard about 
intervening on more than one occasion. Second, as Sveriges Riksbank learned, a central bank that 
scales back or even ceases to intervene before or after it adopts inflation targeting has to educate 
financial markets on the new rules of engagement when it again finds it useful to intervene (Sveriges 
Riksbank (2002)). 
Sterilised intervention 
Actual foreign exchange intervention of the sterilised variety has also been used as an alternative tool 
for dealing with exchange rate related concerns. Sterilisation means that domestic liquidity and policy 
interest rate objectives are prevented from being altered by the purchase or sale of foreign currency 
via the use of appropriate domestic monetary operations. 
There are important differences in the practice of foreign exchange intervention by inflation targeters. 
Some observers seem to have concluded from the example of New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
that inflation targeters abstain from active intervention. A review of practice among our 18 cases, 
however, suggests that abstention is not the rule. 
Even among the industrial country inflation targeters, the association between abstention and inflation 
targeting is looser than often thought. True, the first explicit inflation targeter, New Zealand, has 
eschewed buying or selling its own currency in the foreign exchange market since adopting the 
regime. This non-intervention, however, has not extended to the authorities’ statements to market 
participants.
75  It should also be noted that New Zealand’s non-intervention policy in fact dates back to 
1985 and thus preceded the adoption of inflation targeting. Moreover, New Zealand does continue to 
borrow foreign currency to hold as reserves and its officials have never publicly forsworn 
intervention.
76  For its part, Canada also altered the character and frequency of its foreign exchange 
intervention several years before adopting inflation targeting in 1991, but has continued to intervene 
                                                       
75   Don Brash, former Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, once reported doing everything short of wearing a dress 
down Wall Street to draw the attention of fund managers to the overvaluation of the New Zealand dollar in 1995-96. 
76   Brook (2001, p 110) records, “In New Zealand, to date, the role of intervention has been reserved for cases of ‘extreme 
disorder’ in the foreign exchange market, in which case the goal would be to ensure a well-functioning market rather than to 
defend a particular exchange rate”. She also characterises the period from 1985 through 1988 as one of informal inflation 
targeting, which would make the adoption of inflation targeting and a “clean-floating exchange rate” simultaneous. On the 
intervention policy, see also Bjorksten and Brook (2002, pp 22-23).  
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on occasion since then. Perhaps the strongest archetypal case of the association of non-intervention 
with inflation targeting is that of the United Kingdom, where its adoption of inflation targeting in 1992 
marked a clean break with the ERM era practice of foreign exchange market intervention.
77  
Despite this seeming archetype, occasional intervention is observed in the majority of our 18-country 
sample (see Figure 4). With the decision of Sveriges Riksbank to intervene in mid-2001, only six 
countries (Hungary, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) have 
not intervened as of end-2002 while inflation targeting.
78  Furthermore, while the industrial countries 
split evenly between interveners and non-interveners, three quarters of the emerging market inflation 
targeters choose to intervene in some fashion with some frequency, consistent with our theme that the 




Foreign exchange intervention by inflation targeting countries (as of end-2002) 
  Emerging market  Industrial   
Intervene  BR, CL, MX(?), ID, KR, 
PH, TH, CZ, IL  AU, CA, SE  12 
Do not intervene  HU, PL, ZA(?)  CH, NZ, UK  6 
  12 6  18 
Chi-square test statistic = 1.125 (p-value = 0.289) 
 
Intervention can be an alternative to current monetary policy response. For example, since inflation 
was deemed broadly on track, overt intervention was used instead of interest rate changes in the 
Czech Republic in 2000 to counter the koruna’s strength. Similar actions were taken in Chile in 2001 in 
response to the peso’s rapid decline. In both cases, interventions appeared to reiterate the perceived 
appropriateness of the current monetary policy stance and to underscore the concern about exchange 
rate developments.
80  The view of the Reserve Bank of Australia appears to be that intervention is 
appropriate for resisting the movement of the Australian dollar away from fair value, while monetary 
policy is used if the exchange rate move were to threaten the inflation objective. Given the limited 
pass-through from exchange rate weakness to domestic inflation, the assignment of intervention to the 
exchange rate and the overnight interest rate to inflation has been quite straightforward and clear-cut. 
Intervention can also be used as a complement or as reinforcement to monetary policy actions. For 
instance, the series of dollar injections by the Brazilian central bank in 2001 (and again in 2002) 
sought to provide some additional relief to the real without resorting to excessive monetary tightening, 
                                                       
77   Although there must have been a rebuilding of reserves after September 1992. 
78   The classification of interveners and non-interveners is not always easy. South Africa clearly refrained from intervention in 
the 2001-02 episode of rapid rand depreciation, but its ongoing efforts to purchase foreign exchange on rand strength, as 
outlined in Box B, can be interpreted as a sort of asymmetric policy of intervention. Until mid-2001, Mexico had formal 
mechanisms (options and dollar auctions) in place to facilitate rule-based intervention, even though it has reportedly 
refrained from discretionary intervention since 1998. At the time of writing, the Hungarian forint is approaching the strong 
edge of its ±15% band; official intervention or even a realignment of the exchange rate band may be a possibility in the near 
future. 
79   The chi-square test for the difference in the proportion of interveners in the two country groups (compared to the expected 
proportions) yields a p-value of 0.289, ie cannot reject equality at conventional significance levels. Had Sweden not 
intervened in 2001, the p-value would have become 0.087. However, if one tests the proportion in emerging markets only 
against the observed proportion in industrial countries, the p-value is 0.223 (or 0.009 if Sweden had not intervened). 
80    Of course, as discussed earlier in Section 3.2, monetary policy can also be an alternative to direct intervention. For 
example, in the case of Switzerland, monetary policy plus verbal intervention was used in lieu of actual intervention in 
response to the strength of the franc in late 2001 and 2002. 32 
   
as slowing growth and the threat of a rising debt interest burden made still further increases in interest 
rates an unattractive option.
81 
Intervention can also act as a signal for prospective policy action. The timing of the official purchases 
of dollars in Thailand in late 2001 seemed to foreshadow the subsequent rate cuts. In Sweden, the 
policy interest rate was raised in July 2001 after a series of verbal and actual interventions in response 
to the weakening trend of the krona (see Section 3.1). One may regard the interventions as a signal of 
prospective monetary policy action in the event that the exchange rate’s weakness continues. But this 
arguably can also be a case of monetary policy acting as a complement or reinforcement to 
intervention. 
It may be of interest to note that the focus of most studies
82 of sterilised interventions has been on 
major industrial countries with flexible exchange rates, where interventions are usually seen as rare, 
special events and the associated official attitude reticent. Hence, the conventional wisdom has been 
that intervention must not be used frequently or, taking the argument to the extreme, at all. 
Accordingly, the comparatively more frequent use of - and more open attitude towards - official 
interventions in some emerging market economies have met with some controversy.  
The stigma associated with sterilised interventions, in part also related to past experiences of 
unsuccessful intervention to defend exchange rate pegs or bands during a crisis, may well have driven 
some “newly flexible” economies to the extreme of completely renouncing the use of intervention. As 
discussed above, explicitly forswearing intervention may not only limit the policymaker’s room for 
manoeuvre, but may in fact encourage one-way bets and perverse market dynamics in some cases. It 
would indeed be unfortunate if the policymaker rules out the use of intervention as an alternative 
under the misapprehension that intervention is inconsistent with the principal and practice of inflation 
targeting. 
Alternative arenas and mechanisms of intervention 
Central banks can seek to exert an influence in arenas other than the spot market. For example, in 
response to the rapid depreciation of the domestic currencies in 2001, both the Brazilian and Chilean 
central banks turned to, among other policy measures, the selling of dollar-linked or dollar-
denominated bonds in an attempt to satisfy demand for dollar assets (or, equivalently, hedges for 
dollar liabilities). As political and economic tensions heightened and severe exchange rate pressure 
re-emerged in mid-2002, the Brazilian central bank also “intervened” in yet another unconventional 
way by offering foreign currency loans to provide relief to local corporations whose credit lines had 
been cut. This is an example of intervention for the purpose of alleviating adverse liquidity conditions. 
While the sale of dollar debt by a government or central bank may not, at first glance, bear much 
resemblance to sterilised intervention, there are technical similarities to some extent. In the case of 
intervention to support the local currency, the central bank buys local currency and sells dollars spot, 
funding the sale by liquidating, say, a two-year US Treasury note. In order to prevent local currency 
bank reserves from declining, the central bank buys, say, local currency government paper. Stepping 
back, the sterilised intervention results in an exchange of a local currency asset for a foreign currency 
asset on the balance sheet of the authorities. There is a corresponding and opposite exchange on the 
part of the private sector of a domestic currency asset for a foreign currency asset. This outcome is 
much like the result of a change in debt management that retires a domestic currency liability and 
replaces it with a foreign currency liability. Thus, in general, sterilised intervention can be seen as a 
special case of debt management. 
There are also proactive (instead of reactive) means of “intervention”. Mexico provides an interesting 
example. After the 1994-95 crisis, the Bank of Mexico introduced option and dollar auction schemes 
as part of its foreign reserves and exchange rate management strategies under the new flexible 
exchange rate regime and the transition to inflation targeting. The option scheme allowed the central 
bank to replenish its dollar reserves in a manner and under circumstances that were clearly spelt out 
                                                       
81   In August 2002, the central bank replaced its previous strategy of daily dollar sales by occasional injections to correct for 
abnormal liquidity conditions. 
82   For a literature review and new evidence, see Galati and Melick (2002).  
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ex ante to market participants.
83  The dollar auction scheme was a complement to the use of options. 
Under this scheme, the Bank of Mexico auctioned USD 200 million daily among local credit institutions 
at a minimum price of 1.02 times the fixing rate on the previous working day. This mechanism served 
to smooth the exchange rate (or to reduce volatility) and can be regarded as a type of “rule-based” 
intervention. This combination of the two schemes was suspended at the end of June 2001, since 
reserves had been rebuilt to a more comfortable level. The symmetry of the Mexican approach can be 
contrasted to the asymmetric intervention policy of the South African authorities in 1998-2001 
(see Box B). 
It appears that option-based interventions are gaining ground, while forward market interventions are 
losing ground. Although many central banks do not have the risk control systems required by a fully 
fledged option book, the purchase of a call option on the domestic currency, as reported by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, has a limited cost. Under the right circumstances it can lead market 
participants to “intervene” for the central bank as part of their delta hedging. Despite the advantage of 
having no upfront balance sheet constraint on their magnitudes, forward operations appear to have 
declined in use purely for the purpose of supporting the exchange rate. In part this reflects the 
substantial losses incurred on forward positions during the currency crises of the 1990s. The greater 
emphasis put recently on accountability and transparency could be satisfied by disclosing rather than 
discontinuing such operations. South Africa’s efforts since 1998 to close out the positions on its 
forward book are part of this trend (see Box B).
84 
Balancing benefits and costs 
In addition to the broad idea that official intervention could be a useful alternative in the toolbox of 
policymakers, there may also be reasons to believe that certain of the channels through which 
intervention could have an impact may work better in emerging markets than for actively traded major 
currencies. For example, intervention may exert a direct influence on the exchange rate as it alters the 
relative supply of domestic and foreign currency assets. This portfolio effect could be comparatively 
more important in emerging markets, especially in East Asia, where central banks’ foreign reserves 
are large relative to the turnover in the local foreign exchange markets and the domestic money stock. 
Furthermore, by stepping in as a market-maker, the central bank may help restrain self-reinforcing 
market dynamics and restore a sense of two-way risk. This liquidity effect may be especially pertinent 
in emerging markets with thinner trading. The efforts of the Brazilian and Chilean central banks to 
supply dollar bonds, as well as reserves, to facilitate market functioning during 2001 can be seen in 
this light. 
Nevertheless, as with monetary policy, the bottom-line effectiveness of intervention as a means to 
counteract adverse exchange rate developments is far from unambiguous. Galati and Melick (2002), in 
their study on dollar/mark and dollar/yen interventions, find that although interventions do appear to 
have some impact on the exchange rate in some instances, they cannot be relied upon to work in a 
systematic fashion.
85 
                                                       
83   In August 1996, the Bank of Mexico began to auction to local credit institutions on a monthly basis options contracts that 
would give holders the right to sell a predetermined amount of US dollars against pesos to the central bank on any working 
day prior to the expiration date. Unlike in traditional options, the strike price was not fixed in advance. Instead, the strike 
price was reset daily at the spot “fixing rate” determined on the previous day by the central bank’s survey of local credit 
institutions. As an additional requirement, the option could be exercised only when the strike price was less (ie the peso was 
stronger) than the moving average over the previous 20 working days. Option holders would have an incentive to exercise - 
and the central bank would accumulate reserves - only when the peso had strengthened for some time. 
84   Nonetheless, there could be other reasons unrelated to exchange rate management for central banks to maintain some 
operations in the forward market. The Bank of Thailand, for instance, has continued to use foreign exchange swaps as part 
of its monetary policy operating procedures owing to the segmentation of the money market, that is, to provide baht to 
foreign banks well endowed with foreign currency but not so well equipped with the government bonds required for 
participation in repos (Borio and McCauley (2002)). 
85   It is worth emphasising that the empirical evaluation of intervention is a very tricky business. Apart from the need to control 
for other variables, the very definition of “effectiveness” is in fact not always straightforward. It ought to depend on the 
precise objective of intervention. As emerging market economies may use interventions in different ways than do industrial 
economies, it may be inappropriate to measure effectiveness or success using the same benchmark. In fact, if the objective 
itself varies over time, then using a constant definition of effectiveness may also render the conclusions of the analysis 
invalid. Furthermore, the important question to ask when assessing intervention really ought to be: what the counterfactual 
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Furthermore, although unchecked exchange rate volatility may be undesirable for market functioning 
(as discussed in Section 2.4), thoroughgoing suppression of volatility by the authorities could also 
deter the growth of private market-making capacity. The need to strike a balance is a challenge. 
Last but not least, if intervention is seen as revealing the objectives and preferences of the 
policymaker, then there is a risk that the message may be misinterpreted. This could in turn undermine 
the effectiveness and credibility of policy actions. An effort to communicate to the public the official 
attitude and approach towards intervention may be beneficial in this regard. For example, in the light of 
its experience with intervention in 2001, the Swedish central bank issued a formal document in early 
2002 to clarify its procedures with regard to foreign exchange intervention (see Sveriges Riksbank 
(2002)). 
3.4 Capital  controls 
Often assumed away in the discussion of exchange rate and monetary regimes, restrictions on capital 
account transactions, in one form or another, are in fact still alive and well. A quick glance through the 
appendix tables in the latest issue of the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions will easily confirm this point. Capital controls come in a variety of forms, 
targeting different problems, with various degrees of stringency.
86 
While the general trend among emerging market economies is in the direction of liberalisation, albeit at 
different speeds and to varying extents, the introduction or tightening of capital controls is in practice 
still considered a viable policy alternative in some economies under some circumstances. Recent 
experience has shown that capital controls, if properly designed and applied, can be helpful in 
protecting the economy against the destabilising aspects of capital flows, supporting the 
implementation of other policies or even resolving certain types of policy dilemma.  
Various uses 
A review of some recent cases can help illustrate the various uses of capital controls. 
Chile’s unremunerated reserve requirement on capital inflows in the 1990s is one example. By 
reducing the effect of a tight monetary policy on the exchange rate, the requirement helped reconcile 
the conflicting demands of the economy’s internal and external objectives. It helped contain exchange 
rate volatility by discouraging short-term inflows of “hot money” in favour of longer-term investments. It 
is considered to have made a positive contribution in the economy’s transition to exchange rate 
flexibility and full capital account liberalisation. 
The imposition of controls on capital outflows in Malaysia in 1998 was accompanied by the 
introduction of an exchange rate peg. The controls clearly allowed interest rates to be reduced to 
levels below those on the US dollar, despite the peg. While many observers feared that the controls 
would serve as a shield for a policy of temporising, in the event, observers have compared the policies 
of bank and corporate restructuring in Malaysia to those in Korea, where the policy on capital controls 
moved in the opposite direction. 
However, capital controls have also been used elsewhere in the context of flexible exchange rate 
regimes during episodes of adverse exchange rate developments. For instance, in late 2000 the Bank 
of Thailand, still eschewing intervention after the experience of 1997, sought to strengthen the baht by 
tightening the enforcement of restrictions on lending baht to non-residents. The limit on the extension 
of banking system credit to THB 50 million per counterparty “creates a gap between the onshore and 
offshore baht interest rates” (Nijathaworn (2002)). This is the conventional measure of the 
effectiveness of such controls. For its part, Indonesia resorted to official intervention and interest rate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
would have been had the central bank not intervened. It is extremely difficult to appeal to a counterfactual that would be 
accepted by all observers. 
86   There is quite a substantial literature on capital controls. For example, Ariyoshi et al (2000) provide an extensive survey of 
the use and liberalisation of capital controls. Edison and Warnock (2001) explore the intensity of capital controls. There is 
also a body of works by various other authors (eg Sebastian Edwards) on assessing the “effectiveness” of exchange 
controls, mainly inspired by the Chilean and Malaysian cases. However, we are not concerned here with effectiveness.  
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increases before seeking in early 2001 to impede short selling by limiting the extension of rupiah credit 
to non-residents and generally prohibiting transfer of rupiahs from one non-resident to another. Bank 
Indonesia cited as “encouraging” the decline of the rupiah’s volatility “from an overage of 2.2% in 2000 
to 0.8% and 0.9% in January and February 2001, respectively” (Goeltom (2002)).
87  Thailand 
subsequently eased some of the restrictions in early 2002, as the baht regained strength. 
Controls have also been deployed or enforced as a last resort policy option when the use of both 
monetary policy and official intervention is somehow constrained. For example, in response to an 
acceleration of the rand’s depreciation, the South African authorities tightened the enforcement of 
exchange controls in October 2001. At that time, inflationary pressures did not yet appear sufficiently 
great to warrant monetary tightening, while direct intervention to support the rand was not an attractive 
option owing to the low levels of foreign exchange reserves and the commitment to draw down the 
forward book (see Box B).
88 
Other measures have also been used to help mitigate exchange rate pressures. For example, the 
Czech authorities have sought to avoid further appreciation of the koruna by requiring that foreign 
currency privatisation proceeds be brought directly to the central bank, bypassing the foreign 
exchange market. 
Limitations 
As with monetary policy and official intervention, the use of capital account restrictions as a policy 
instrument to counter the impact of unwelcome exchange rate developments has its costs and 
limitations. First, enforcement tends to be administratively costly, and effectiveness at times an open 
question. Second, restrictions may fail to discriminate between desirable investment and less 
beneficial flows, thus denying the economy some valuable financial resources. Furthermore, the 
stigma associated with the use of capital controls can generate negative investor sentiment, which 
may in turn impede the economy’s access to the international capital markets. Last but not least, 
excessively intrusive measures can hamper financial development and are by no means a substitute 
for making progress in reforms at both the macro and micro levels. 
3.5 Summing  up 
While inflation targeting may be a framework that is typically free from formal exchange rate 
commitments, it is nonetheless not free from exchange rate considerations. The recent experience of 
our 18 sample countries vividly demonstrates that exchange rate fluctuations have posed significant 
challenges to the pursuit of inflation targets, especially among emerging market economies. 
Policymakers, in turn, have sought to respond in a variety of ways to these challenges. 
In our review of the different types of policy scenarios that our sample countries have faced in recent 
years, we find that, in practice, policymakers in inflation targeting countries do react to the exchange 
rate above and beyond its impact on inflation.  
We also find that policymakers have generally not restricted themselves to using monetary policy in 
the pursuit of their inflation targets. Fractional or alternative instruments have also been used to 
improve the policymaker’s room for manoeuvre. A majority of the central banks in our sample have 
intervened in the foreign exchange market at least once in some manner while inflation targeting. Even 
the ones that have not engaged in actual intervention typically do not rule it out as a possibility. In fact, 
explicitly forswearing the use of intervention may yield perverse results. Capital controls have also 
been used as yet another fractional instrument to deal with unwelcome exchange rate fluctuations, 
albeit to a lesser extent. 
                                                       
87   These may be presumed to be daily figures, which would correspond to 35% annualised volatility and 13% and 14% for 
January and February 2001, respectively.  
88   However, the governor of the South African Reserve Bank did state that “It would have been a mistake to intervene then 
even if we had had larger reserves. Should we have been tempted to get involved with the market when it was moving so 
sharply down, we would have burnt our fingers very badly.” (See “Interview: Tito Mboweni” in Central Banking, vol 12 (4), 
pp  27-36 (May 2002).) Thus, given the preference to stick to the “non-intervention” policy, the tightening of exchange 
controls appeared to be a logical alternative. 36 
   
Despite their greater concern about exchange rate fluctuations, the emerging market inflation targeters 
in our sample do seem to behave consistently in attaching a higher priority to their inflation targets 
than to other objectives. Notwithstanding the active response to unwelcome exchange rate changes in 
some countries, there is as yet no proof that any of them has acted to influence the exchange rate in 
blatant contradiction to the announced inflation target. 
It should also be noted that responding to adverse exchange rate developments is by no means the 
monopoly of emerging market economies. The authorities in some relatively open industrial 
economies such as Sweden and Switzerland have also come across situations in which policy action 
against exchange rate movements was deemed necessary.  
Of course, with any actions, there are always costs and limitations. A policy implication follows: since a 
certain degree of judgement and flexibility in policy response is often necessary, clear and consistent 
communication of the rationale behind any policy action taken is essential. 
4. Concluding  remarks 
In this paper, we have sought to provide an overview analysis of the role of the exchange rate in 
inflation targeting regimes. In particular, we have explored two main issues. The first is why the 
exchange rate matters, potentially for all economies, but especially for emerging market economies. 
The second is under what circumstances and how inflation targeting economies have dealt with the 
various challenges presented by exchange rate fluctuations in recent years.  
In comparing the experience of 12 emerging market inflation targeters with that of six of their industrial 
country counterparts, we made the following observations: 
First, emerging market economies tend to be relatively more exposed to exchange rate fluctuations for 
various structural and historical reasons. In particular, since many of the emerging economies under 
review are still in the relatively early stages of accommodating themselves to an environment of 
greater exchange rate flexibility, the private sector and policymakers alike are likely to remain sensitive 
to adverse exchange rate movements, at least in the near term. 
In the longer run, however, improved inflation outcomes, consolidation of policy credibility and 
economic development can be expected to help reduce some of the vulnerabilities of emerging market 
economies. Yet, to the extent that vulnerabilities due to structural factors cannot be easily reduced, 
some level of policy response to guard against adverse exchange rate developments is likely to 
remain in place, regardless of the specific policy regime. 
Second, under inflation targeting in particular, exchange rate considerations can be expected to play a 
prominent role in emerging market economies, given the substantial influence of the exchange rate on 
inflation in these economies. Experience in recent years shows that exchange rate movements have 
posed significant challenges to emerging market inflation targeters. 
Third, the emerging market inflation targeters have in practice responded flexibly to the various 
challenges posed by exchange rate fluctuations - including and beyond those involving inflation - using 
not only monetary policy, but sometimes also alternative or even multiple policy instruments. 
Notwithstanding the explicit concern and active response in some countries to exchange rate 
movements, there is as yet no clear evidence that any of them has acted in contradiction to the 
announced inflation target. 
Nonetheless, the line between responding to the exchange rate within the bounds of inflation 
targeting, and managing the exchange rate as a goal per se, can be quite thin at times. The onus is on 
the policymaker to explain to the public the difference, if any, between the two types of actions and the 
rationale for the policy decisions actually taken. Effective communication of policy intentions with 
respect to the role of the exchange rate will be crucial for the credibility of the policy regimes. 
Finally, none of the above should be taken to suggest that the cost of exchange rate movements and 
the policy attention thereto are relevant only to emerging market economies. Recent experience 
reminds us that having to keep an eye on the exchange rate is also a fact of life in industrial 





Overview of sample economies 








Brazil 1999  CPI  SELIC  O/N 
Chile 1991  CPI  O/N  discount 
Mexico 1999  CPI  91-day  Cetes
3 
Indonesia 2000  CPI  1-month  SBI 
Korea  1998  Core CPI  O/N call 
Philippines 2002  CPI  Reverse  repo 
Thailand  2000  Core CPI  14-day repo 
Czech Republic  1998  CPI  2-week repo 
Hungary 2001  CPI  2-week  deposit 
Poland 1998  CPI  28-day  intervention 
Israel 1992  CPI  Headline 
South Africa   2000  CPI-X  Repo 
Australia 1994  CPI  Cash  rate 
Canada  1991  CPI  O/N funding rate 
New Zealand   1990  CPI  Cash rate 
Sweden 1993  CPI  Repo 
Switzerland  2000  CPI  3-month CHF Libor
4 
United Kingdom  1992  RPIX  Repo 
1  According to Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), except the most recently introduced regimes: Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Hungary.   
2  Latest information according to Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002), except the most recent regimes.   
3  Not 
formally the policy rate. Policy stance is indicated by changes in the “corto”.   
4  Policy stance expressed as a target range for 
this interest rate. 
Sources: Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001); Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002); national data. 
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Table 2 
Openness and pass-through 
Pass-through 
Openness



















1980–89  1990–99 1998–2001 One year  One year  One year  Three 
quarters 
Brazil  16.1 14.0  18.4  0.39   ...   ...  0.84 
Chile  39.5 44.1  44.4  0.35   ...   ...  0.07 
Mexico 19.3  42.1  56.8  0.27  0.93    ...  0.94 
Indonesia  38.6 47.1  66.1  0.41  0.92   ...   ... 
Korea 63.3  55.5  69.3  0.10  0.59    ...  0.13 
Philippines 37.1  61.7  89.1  0.33  1.16    ...  0.17 
Thailand 47.9  73.6  98.5  0.12  0.19    ...  0.28 
Czech Republic
7  ...  88.8  109.5  0.16 1.17 0.61 0.06 
Hungary
7 ...  87.8  116.9  0.48    ...  0.85  0.54 
Poland
7  ...  38.5 43.8  0.08 0.80 0.99 0.45 
Israel  55.9 51.6  56.0  0.28  0.55   ...   ... 
South Africa  45.7  36.4  42.6  0.13  0.47    ...  0.14 
Australia 27.0  30.1  34.1  0.10  0.48  0.69    ... 
Canada 45.9  56.3  69.9  0.11  0.19  0.68    ... 
New  Zealand  45.6 45.6  50.0  0.27   ...   ...   ... 
Sweden 50.5  52.3  63.3  0.03  0.22  0.59    ... 
Switzerland 57.9  53.6  60.4  0.07  0.02  0.94    ... 
United Kingdom  42.1  41.6  41.7  0.02  0.06  0.47    ... 
United States  14.8  17.4  19.3  0.02  0.34  0.41    ... 
Japan 20.8  15.7  17.3    ...  0.09  1.26    ... 
Euro area
8 23.3  21.9  28.0  0.13  0.07  0.79    ... 
Emerging market countries  ...  40.0 52.8  0.26 0.75 0.82 0.35 
Non-G3 industrial countries  44.0  45.4  50.4  0.12  0.19  0.67   ... 
G3 countries  18.6  18.6  21.6  0.07  0.17  0.82   ... 
1    Average level of the ratio between merchandise exports plus imports and GDP (in percentages).     
2  ∆ log domestic CPI 
regressed on ∆ log effective exchange rate (domestic currency over foreign currency).     
3  Excludes  hyperinflation 
episodes.   
4  Error correction estimate; for non-European countries and United Kingdom: log domestic CPI regressed on log US
dollar exchange rate + log index of international commodity price index; for other countries: regressed on log Deutsche mark
exchange rate + log of German CPI.    
5  OLS estimate; ∆ log import prices regressed on ∆ log effective exchange rate (domestic 
currency over foreign currency).     
6    Accumulated inflation, measured by change in CPI (over one year and two years
respectively) regressed on accumulated depreciation, measured by the bilateral exchange rate (against the US dollar or the 
Deutsche mark respectively).   
7  Data available only as from 1993.   
8  Pass-through estimates are those for Germany. 
Sources: Campa and Goldberg (2002); Choudhri and Hakura (2001); Hausmann et al (2000); Mihaljek and Klau (2001); IMF; 





Inflation and crises 
Inflation




1980–89 1990–99  1998–2001  1972–98 
Brazil 229.1  319.2  5.5  3 
Chile 21.2  11.5  4.0  4 
Mexico  65.1 20.1 11.6 7 
Indonesia  9.6 13.7 21.9 6 
Korea  8.1 5.7 3.6  3 
Philippines  14.4 9.6 6.7  5 
Thailand  5.7 5.0 2.9  2 
Czech Republic
3  ...  14.0  5.3    ... 
Hungary    8.9 22.0 10.8    ... 
Poland 43.0  52.0  8.6    ... 
Israel 104.7  11.2  3.2  1 
South  Africa  14.6 9.8 5.8  9 
Australia  8.4 2.5 2.8  3 
Canada  6.5 2.2 2.0  2 
New  Zealand  11.8 2.1 1.6  5 
Sweden  7.9 3.2 0.9  1 
Switzerland  3.3 2.3 0.8    ... 
United  Kingdom  7.4 3.7 2.4  3 
United  States  5.5 3.0 2.5  1 
Japan  2.5 1.2  –0.3  1 
Euro  area  6.6 2.8 1.8    ... 
Emerging market countries  47.7  41.1  7.5  4.4 
Non-G3 industrial countries   7.5  2.7  1.8  2.8 
G3  countries  4.9 2.3 1.3  1.0 
1  Average change in consumer prices (geometric mean of annual changes); group averages: simple arithmetic means of 
countries’ average changes.   
2    Currency crises as identified by Eichengreen and Bordo (2002).   
3  Data available only as 
from 1985. 
Sources: Eichengreen and Bordo (2002); IMF; national data. 40 
   
 
Table 4 
Possible determinants of pass-through
1 
















2  0.001 
(0.803) 





2   –0.012 
(–3.262) 





2     0.001 
(1.703) 
   0.001 
(1.308) 
 
Ln(Inflation)      0.075 
(2.812) 
   0.061 
(1.685) 
Dollarisation







2  0.037 0.385  0.146  0.318 0.001 0.458 0.494 
Adjusted R
2          0.303  0.350 
Observations  19 19  19  19 19 19 19 
1  Regression analysis by ordinary least squares, with the pass-through coefficients from Choudhri and Hakura (2001) as 
dependent variables. Sample excludes Japan and the euro area (pass-through figures not available). T-statistics in 
parentheses.   
2  Same definition as that used in the scatter plots (Graphs 1 and 2). 









Export partners  Import partners 
Largest  Second largest  Largest  Second largest   
Country Share Country Share Country Share  Country  Share 
Brazil  US  23.8  Euro area  23.1  US  23.1  Euro area  21.1 
Chile  Euro  area  18.0 US  16.8 US  19.9  Argentina  17.1 
Mexico  US  88.6  Euro area  2.7  US  72.9  Euro area  6.7 
Indonesia Japan  23.1  US  13.6  Japan  16.0  Taiwan,  China 11.2 
Korea  US 21.7 Japan  11.7 Japan  19.5  US  18.0 
Philippines  US 29.9 Japan  14.7 Japan  19.0  US  16.8 
Thailand  US 21.3 Japan  14.7 Japan  24.7  US  11.8 
Czech Republic
   Euro area  62.4  Poland  5.4  Euro area  56.0  Russia  6.5 
Hungary  Euro area  69.6  US  5.3  Euro area  53.4  Russia  8.0 
Poland  Euro area  54.9  UK  4.1  Euro area  46.7  Russia  8.4 
Israel  US  36.8 Euro  area  21.9 Euro  area  33.1  US  18.1 
South Africa  Euro area  28.1  US  11.1  Euro area  31.3  US  11.9 
Australia  Japan  19.9 US 9.9 US  20.1  Euro  area  13.4 
Canada  US  87.4  Euro area  2.8  US  64.4  Euro area  6.0 
New Zealand  Australia  20.2  US  14.8  Australia  22.1  US  17.4 
Sweden  Euro area  39.3  US  9.5  Euro area  46.0  UK  9.1 
Switzerland  Euro area  50.5  US  13.0  Euro area  64.4  US  7.6 
United Kingdom  Euro area  53.3  US  15.8  Euro area  46.3  US  13.4 
United States  Canada  22.6  Euro area  15.1  Canada  18.5  Euro area  13.4 
Japan US  30.1  Euro  area  12.7  US  19.1  China  14.5 
Euro  area  UK  18.6 US  16.9 UK  15.0  US 14.2 
1  Major trade partners in 2000; measured by the percentage shares of exports to (imports from) the partner countries in a 
country’s total exports (imports). Trade in goods only.   




   
 
Table 6 
“Ability” to borrow in domestic currency 
 In  bonds
1, 2  In bank loans
2, 3 
  1996 1998 2001 1996 1998 2001 
Brazil  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 4.25 4.23 
Chile  0.00 0.00 0.00 4.16 0.70 3.70 
Mexico  0.02 0.01 0.15    ... 0.67 3.17 
Indonesia  2.22 0.85 0.26 4.78 1.25 2.67 
Korea  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.70 1.01 5.53 
Philippines  0.51 0.61 0.35 6.91 4.85 4.82 
Thailand  0.78 0.35  12.51 2.74 4.16 7.68 
Czech  Republic  0.00  0.00  0.00 13.83 13.97 18.50 
Hungary  0.00 0.00 0.00    ... 2.70 6.52 
Poland  0.00 0.82 0.00 4.34 5.75  10.21 
Israel  0.00 0.00 0.00 4.15 1.69 1.93 
South Africa   0.00  13.46  6.18  7.52  19.23  18.85 
Australia  26.75 21.34 12.26 24.72 22.63 49.27 
Canada  19.23 13.64 13.13 19.89 17.67 26.68 
New Zealand   3.71  2.93  0.96  28.42  27.04  29.34 
Sweden  1.80  1.98  2.53 26.79 29.97 35.04 
Switzerland  17.28 19.26 13.22 29.63 33.96 26.72 
United  Kingdom  48.74 44.10 40.43  9.55 11.29 13.38 
United  States  70.05 78.13 84.22 83.71 81.72 86.57 
Japan  45.93 51.15 48.94 39.51 54.34 47.95 
Euro  area  50.87 53.20 64.68 40.84 22.75 23.15 
Emerging  market  countries  0.29 1.34 1.62 3.86 5.02 7.32 
Non-G3 industrial countries  19.59 17.21 13.75 23.17 23.76 30.07 
G3 countries   55.62 60.83 65.95 54.69 52.94 52.56 
1  International bonds outstanding; domestic currency issues as a percentage of total issues.   
2  Group averages, simple 
arithmetic means.   







Foreign exchange turnover in 2001
1 
Turnover by market
2  Turnover by currency  
Market/currency 
as a ratio to  
GDP
3 
as a percentage 
of total turnover
4
as a ratio to  
GDP
3 
as a percentage 
of total turnover
4
Brazil/real  2.00 0.56 2.24 0.22 
Chile/peso  8.19  0.27   .   . 
Mexico/peso  3.77 1.02 4.45 0.43 
Indonesia/rupiah  1.01 0.07 0.96 0.02 
Korea/won  4.70 1.01 5.45 0.42 
Philippines/peso  1.57 0.05 1.71 0.02 
Thailand/baht  3.17 0.18 3.88 0.08 
Czech  Republic/koruna  6.72 0.18 9.87 0.10 
Hungary/forint  0.93 0.02 0.97 0.01 
Poland/zloty  8.01 0.66 9.19 0.27 
Israel/shekel  1.70  0.09   .   . 
South Africa/rand   17.10  0.96  24.16  0.48 
Australia/dollar 19.09  3.21  35.32  2.12 
Canada/dollar 9.12  3.07  18.57  2.23 
New Zealand/dollar   14.18  0.33  34.13  0.29 
Sweden/krona 16.72  1.68  35.85  1.28 
Switzerland/franc 25.78  2.90  75.66  3.03 
United Kingdom/pound   22.07  14.71  27.90  6.62 
United  States/dollar  6.04 28.30 27.07 45.20 
Japan/yen  6.46 13.13 15.66 11.34 
Euro  area/euro  6.77 19.76 18.12 18.82 
Emerging  market  countries/currencies  4.23 5.08 4.79 2.05 
Non-G3 industrial countries/currencies   18.40  25.91  31.04  15.56 
G3  countries/currencies  6.35 61.20 21.96 75.36 
1  Spot transactions, outright forwards and foreign exchange swaps; net of local inter-dealer double-counting.   
2  Local currency 
against all other currencies.   
3  GDP of the listed country; estimate refers to the first quarter 2001 on the basis of the daily
average turnover in April 2001.   
4  Total turnover adjusted for double-counting; data refer to April 2001.  
Source: BIS, Financial market databases, Triennial Central Bank Survey, 2001. 
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Table 8a 
Foreign exchange bid-ask spreads; annual averages
1 
  1993 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001 
Brazilian  real  0.257 0.130 0.019 0.017 0.095 0.073 
Chilean  peso    ...  0.108 0.086 0.114 0.058 0.050 
Mexican  peso  0.083 0.625 0.135 0.114 0.129 0.133 
Indonesian  rupiah  0.200 0.076 0.547 2.755 0.491 0.519 
Korean  won  0.031 0.017 0.465 0.334 0.109 0.416 
Philippine  peso  2.288 0.489 1.443 0.966 0.471 0.538 
Thai  baht  0.145 0.075 0.515 0.534 0.143 0.163 
Czech  koruna    ...  0.069 0.126 0.123 0.078 0.075 
Hungarian  forint    ...  0.068 0.026 0.056 0.086 0.185 
Polish  zloty    ...  0.127 0.137 0.189 0.171 0.150 
Israeli  shekel  3.171 0.173 0.255 0.305 0.216 0.211 
South  African  rand    ...  0.045 0.072 0.210 0.127 0.125 
Australian  dollar  0.086 0.070 0.071 0.086 0.095 0.100 
Canadian  dollar  0.039 0.057 0.037 0.044 0.066 0.057 
New  Zealand  dollar  0.138 0.108 0.106 0.134 0.157 0.169 
Swedish  krona  0.143 0.127 0.073 0.105 0.090 0.080 
Swiss  franc  0.062 0.078 0.061 0.063 0.051 0.049 
Pound  sterling  0.061 0.056 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.046 
Japanese  yen  0.090 0.183 0.101 0.065 0.053 0.040 
Euro
2  0.131 0.146 0.065 0.039 0.042 0.047 
Emerging  market  currencies    ...  0.167 0.319 0.476 0.181 0.220 
Industrial country currencies  0.094 0.103 0.071 0.074 0.076 0.073 
1  National currency versus US dollar; as a percentage of the midrate; group averages: simple arithmetic means of countries’
average spreads.   
2  Prior to 1998, synthetic euro (GDP-weighted). 








Foreign exchange bid-ask spreads; specific months
1 
  Jul 1993  Dec 1994  Jul 1997  Aug 1998  Jan 1999  Sep 2001 
Brazilian  real  0.003 0.192 0.015 0.020 0.728 0.066 
Chilean  peso  0.073 0.103 0.069 0.067 0.126 0.056 
Mexican  peso  0.064 1.203 0.104 0.146 0.228 0.146 
Indonesian  rupiah  0.286 0.020 0.269 2.071 1.288 0.433 
Korean  won  0.027 0.025 0.440 0.428 0.282 0.532 
Philippine  peso  1.843 1.053 3.496 0.816 0.726 0.350 
Thai  baht  0.132 0.072 1.038 0.351 0.266 0.206 
Czech  koruna  0.184 0.071 0.125 0.099 0.115 0.076 
Hungarian  forint    ...  0.127 0.025 0.108 0.095 0.291 
Polish  zloty    ...  0.089 0.186 0.334 0.275 0.088 
Israeli  shekel  2.867 0.183 0.421 0.292 0.264 0.262 
South  African  rand  0.053 0.044 0.066 0.228 0.197 0.109 
Australian  dollar  0.075 0.068 0.067 0.089 0.080 0.111 
Canadian  dollar  0.040 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.064 0.046 
New  Zealand  dollar  0.128 0.114 0.110 0.138 0.128 0.176 
Swedish  krona  0.123 0.117 0.065 0.119 0.098 0.064 
Swiss  franc  0.062 0.066 0.066 0.061 0.068 0.041 
Pound  sterling  0.065 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.047 0.039 
Japanese  yen  0.093 0.100 0.069 0.057 0.058 0.040 
Euro
2  0.110 0.109 0.045 0.042 0.047 0.056 
Emerging  market  currencies  0.553 0.265 0.521 0.413 0.383 0.218 
Industrial country currencies  0.087 0.084 0.065 0.075 0.074 0.071 
1  National currency versus US dollar; as a percentage of the midrate; group averages: simple arithmetic means of countries’
average spreads.   
2  Prior to 1998, synthetic euro (GDP-weighted). 
Source: BIS, Financial market databases. 
 
 
    
   
Table 9 
Experience with exchange rate changes and inflation targets
1 
Inflation Inflation Inflation  Inflation  Inflation   
Target
























 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
4 
Emerging                           
Brazil ...  1.7  –1.0  6-10  8.9    –34.4  4-8 6.0  0.1  2-6 7.7    –19.0  1.5-5.5  10.2    –15.1 
Chile 4.5  4.7  –2.0  4.3  2.4  –6.5  3.5  4.4 –1.4 2-4  2.6 –7.5  2-4  3.3 –8.7 
Mexico ...  18.6  –7.9  ≤ 13  12.3 –7.0  ≤ 10  7.2 –3.1  ≤ 6.5  4.4   11.6  ≤ 4.5  4.5 –8.4 
Indonesia
5 ...  77.6  –79.3  ...  1.9  76.5  3-5  5.9    –19.6  4-6  8.7    –15.6  9-10  8.7    26.5 
Korea
6, 7 8-10  7.5    –30.0  2-4  0.8    15.0  1.5-3.5 1.9  2.7  2-4 3.6  –6.2  2-4 2.1  3.0 
Philippines
6  ...  9.7  –29.2 ...  6.7 3.1 ...  4.3  –12.3  ...  6.1  –11.5  5-6  3.1  –0.4 
Thailand
6  ... 7.2  –31.5  ... 1.8  9.9 0-3.5 0.7  –7.6 0-3.5 1.3  –5.8 0-3.5  0.4  4.2 
Czech Republic
8 5.5-6.5  1.7  1.2 4-5  1.5  –2.9 3.5-5.5  3.0  1.8 2-4  2.4  5.7 3-5  0.5    13.0 
Hungary  ...  10.3  –10.8 ...  11.2  –6.5 ...  10.1 –5.5  6-8  6.8  4.7  3.5-5.5  4.8  2.9 
Poland  ≤ 9.5  8.5 –3.3  8-8.5  9.8  –8.1 5.4-6.8  8.6  –3.5 6-8  3.6    22.7  4-6  0.7    –11.0 
Israel 7-10  8.7  –0.9  4  1.3  –9.2 3-4  0.0  3.3 2.5-3.5  1.4  7.5 2-3  6.8    –21.2 
South Africa
6  ...  7.0  –9.9 ...  6.9  –9.4 ...  7.1 –9.0  ...  6.0 –5.8  3-6  8.8    –24.9 
Industrial                           
Australia 2-3  1.6    –11.1  2-3  1.8  5.2 2-3  5.8    –10.1  2-3  3.1  –5.2 2-3  2.3  5.5 
Canada  1-3  1.0  –1.8 1-3  2.6 –1.4 1-3  3.2  –0.7 1-3  0.7  0.1 1-3  4.2  –2.0 
New Zealand
7 0-3  1.1    –16.3  0-3 1.3  –0.1  0-3 4.0    –10.7  0-3 1.8  –3.1  0-3  2.1    12.6 
Sweden 1-3  –1.2  3.3 1-3  1.3 –5.0 1-3  1.0  2.5  1-3  2.7    –11.2  1-3 2.2  3.9 
Switzerland  ...  –0.1 1.7  ...  1.6  –0.5  0-2  1.5  –1.3  0-2  0.3 1.6  0-2  1.2 6.4 
United  Kingdom 2.5  2.6  6.5 2.5  2.2 –1.6 2.5  2.0  –0.8  2.5  1.9  2.0 2.5  2.6  –2.5 
1  Figures are year-on-year percentage changes at year-end, unless otherwise stated. For actual inflation, a light (dark) grey shaded cell indicates undershooting (overshooting) of the announced target. For 
exchange rate, light (dark) grey shading indicates appreciation (depreciation) of 10% or more during an inflation targeting year.    
2  See Table 1 for the inflation target concepts as of 2002; past changes in 
the concepts are indicated separately.   
3  Nominal effective appreciation between Q2 of previous year and Q2 of current year.   
4  For actual inflation, typically including information up to 
November/December 2002.   
5  2000-01, targeted core inflation.   
6  Actual inflation is measured as average of the year, as the definition of the inflation target explicitly refers to averages.   
7  1998-99, 
targeted core inflation.   
8  1998-2001, targeted net inflation; from 2002 to 2005, headline CPI inflation band targeted to gradually decline from 3-5% to 2-4%. 
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